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  preface
On 22 and 23 November 2007, the wrr celebrated its thirty-fifth an-
niversary by organising a two-day symposium on the relationship 
between science, policy and politics. The central questions were as fol-
lows. Is a state capable of thinking, and how can it be supported in doing 
so? Which developments in society and science influence the relation-
ship between policy and politics? How can learning be encouraged in a 
democracy, and what do we really mean when we say that democracy 
cannot exist without learning? Finally, under which conditions can 
scientists contribute to the quality and future-proofing of government 
policy? 
These are all questions that reach to the heart of the work of the wrr but 
also raise further questions; the mission of the wrr has not changed, 
but the circumstances within which it performs its task have. The 
Council therefore marked its anniversary by dedicating a symposium to 
these issues. At a time when there is once again discussion on the best 
configuration and functioning of an advisory and knowledge system, it 
seemed appropriate to address these questions in a fundamental way. 
During the first afternoon session of the symposium, in the greatly 
esteemed presence of hm the Queen and the Prime Minister, speakers 
such as Bruno Latour and Kees Schuyt shed their illuminating light on 
these questions. During the second day, a selection of international ex-
perts were on hand to discuss these issues with the members and staff of 
the wrr and some eighty distinguished invitees. The lectures of some 
of these speakers that contributed are included in this booklet. 
The wrr looks back with pleasure on both days, and is delighted to 
present you with the texts and a dvd recording of the first day of the 
symposium as a small supplement to the book1 published on this theme 
to mark the wrr’s anniversary.
Wim B.H.J van de Donk
Chairman wrr
1 Op steenworp afstand. Op de brug tussen wetenschap en politiek,  
Paul den Hoed and Anne-Greet Keizer (eds.)
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 the fate of knowledge in science, 
politics and societ y
Kees Schuyt
I
Two questions are very much at the forefront at this gathering. The 
first, as reflected in the title of this symposium, is: Can the state 
think? This question concerns the demand for knowledge in the 
formulation of government policy and more generally the demand 
for and usefulness of think tanks. The second question is one I have 
added myself: If advisory councils did not exist, would they have 
to be invented? To focus this on the wrr, if this body, established 
thirty-five years ago in a mood of academic and political optimism, 
had not existed, would it – or would it need to be – established at the 
present time, in the current political climate? This is the question 
concerning the right to exist of the wrr and in particular the objec-
tifiable need for scientific advice in politics and governance. I should 
like to examine both these questions, in which regard the former 
question can be answered rather more easily than the latter.
Is a state able to think? No, of course not. No more than a city is able 
to write a poem or a neighbourhood a novel. One needs to be cautious 
when it comes to the personification of social systems. But the people 
who jointly make up the state – are they able to think? Can comput-
ers think? Can politicians and administrators reflect on future policy 
or their own policies? Seen in this light, the topic of this symposium 
throws up some exciting new questions. The Dutch psychologist 
Nico Frijda has compared the ability of computers to think with 
human intellectual capacity and his answer as to whether comput-
ers could think was a clear ‘no’. Thinking implies self-reflection and 
creativity and opening up new, as-yet unexplored and no more than 
visualised pathways. In response to the question as to whether people 
could think he replied “yes, but only a little bit”. That limited ability 
is, however, at the same time sufficient to influence society positively.
     
II
Optimism concerning the utilisation of scientific knowledge has 
also underpinned the formation of many think tanks and this truism 
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persists to this day. Political parties in many countries have their own 
think tanks. Ayaan Hirsi Ali went to America to work at the Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute in what is regarded worldwide as an impor-
tant step in her career. Knowledge is power. Knowledge – especially 
scientific knowledge – has become an inseparable part of government 
policy. When foot and mouth disease broke out in Britain recently, 
a scientifically-based scenario was in place for limiting the epide-
miological consequences as quickly and effectively as possible. In a 
comparable crisis situation in the Netherlands, after the Chernobyl 
disaster, former Minister Pieter Winsemius and his staff were in a 
position to make a swift and accurate appraisal of the ensuing risks, 
thereby helping gain acceptance for the emergency policy. Upon the 
outbreak of sars, scientists played a prominent role in the necessary 
decisions and policies. Scientific insights provide legitimacy for gov-
ernance and policy. 
At the same time, there was something special about the establish-
ment of the wrr in comparison with other think tanks: The Council 
has no party affiliations, enjoys an independent status at some dis-
tance from its client and is able independently to select the topics on 
which advice is provided. In my own words, what is particularly char-
acteristic of the wrr is the fact that it does not have anyone above 
it, in the way that civil servants always have a minister above them, 
of whom they need to take account in forming policy; nor does it 
have anyone behind it, in the way that politicians always have to look 
over their shoulders to make sure the electorate is prepared to follow 
them; and the wrr has almost no one beneath it, in the way that big 
research institutes are sometimes obliged to accept assignments in 
order to keep their staff employed. In short, the wrr is small and 
special. These characteristics give the wrr a unique position, and the 
question concerning the raison d’être of such an advisory body will 
need to take this far-reaching independence into account. My answer 
to the intriguing question as to whether the wrr would still be es-
tablished in the present day is something I will return to later; first of 
all I should like to examine a number of changes that have taken place 
over the past thirty-five or so years, especially the changing fate of 
scientific knowledge in relation to politics and society.
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III	
The optimism with which science and scientific knowledge were ap-
proached in terms of policy or more broadly politics in 1972 cannot be 
divorced from the status of science at that time and the related idea of 
rational, systematic policy formation. There was among the scientific 
community at that time a widespread acceptance of neo-positivist 
attitudes, including those concerning the distinction between norms 
and facts and between normative statements and factual assertions. 
Scientific knowledge had an edge on everyday knowledge. Popper’s 
demarcation line of falsifiable knowledge held out the prospect 
of scientific progress, and that progress was projected onto policy 
formulation for the future: Government policy too could be consis-
tently improved and made more rational and effective with the aid of 
science. The so-called malleability of social processes was fed by  
science, in the same way that nowadays a different kind of mallea-
bility – that of individual behaviour – is once again being encouraged 
by all sorts of new discoveries in various areas of science. That such 
rational policy formation and surveys of the future would rapidly 
disappoint in practice was something that had still to be discovered 
from experience. The assignment to draw up surveys of the future 
also bore witness to this assumption of rationality. Anyone who now 
examines the wrr report of 1977 entitled The Next Twenty-Five 
Years, to which the cream of the Dutch scientific community at that 
time contributed in all sorts of areas, is forced to conclude that many 
social trends over the next twenty-five years were not foreseen and 
that much of what was predicted failed to come about. But that hap-
pens in the best of scientific families.
IV
Much has changed between 1972 and now, in both science and in 
politics and society. The changes in society are reflected in the chang-
ing topics on which the wrr has advised. I will say something in a 
moment about the changes in politics. With regard to the place and 
prestige of scientific knowledge not a great deal has changed, but 
much has changed when it comes to the concept of knowledge itself 
and attitudes concerning the formation of knowledge, and it is these 
latter changes that have directly affected the belief in the value of 
scientific advice for government policy. 
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First of all let us examine what has not changed greatly in relation 
to science. To me, it is notable how large and sustained the growth 
in scientific knowledge in virtually all areas of scholarship has been 
over the most recent period. And that train of increasing knowledge 
hurtles on, unimpeded by old cultural or new religious taboos. A 
significant increase in knowledge is taking place everywhere, finding 
its way into industrial products, the shaping of the landscape and 
urban development, all sorts of new technologies, the economy and 
ecology, dietary habits and health care. The optimism concerning 
scientific knowledge and its social relevance have not, in my view, 
changed greatly; what has changed is the optimism concerning the 
direct utilisation of that knowledge in policy. Despite ongoing social 
impact, the status of science has changed. The following factors have, 
in my view, played a role in this regard.
In the first place, the premises of the neo-positivist view of science 
came under fire from around 1970 onwards: Scientific progress is 
not something internal to science itself but also depends on a large 
number of social factors. Thomas Kuhn and other post-positivists 
put into perspective a number of sharp dichotomies, for example 
between nature and culture, between norms and the determination 
of facts and between detached scientific knowledge and perceived 
reality. This does not mean that those distinctions are entirely unten-
able, let alone unusable (the debate rumbles on to this day), but since 
the 1970s and 1980s, when the sociological turn became evident in 
the philosophy of science, science has become increasingly viewed 
as socially embedded and no longer rests on an unshakable pedes-
tal. Science is regarded as the work of man. The investigations into 
the production of knowledge in various ‘knowledge factories’ have 
contributed towards this. This has made it easier for outsiders to 
criticise scientific knowledge, while the internal correctability of that 
knowledge has also become more problematical. The social sciences 
have proved particularly sensitive to these internal scientific changes: 
There are few matters in the sciences on which people are agreed.
As insight into the materialisation and maintenance of knowledge 
grows, that scientific knowledge also becomes viewed as part of social 
positions and interests. It also becomes more easily criticisable, not 
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on the basis of substantive arguments but on the grounds of more or 
less explicit ad hominem arguments. The characteristics of the maker 
of knowledge are scrutinised, and not the substantive reasoning and 
complexes of facts put forward. In my observation, the wrr has re-
cently been less troubled by this than it was, for example, in its early 
days. It can of course be maintained that in previous times too, deliv-
ery of the scientific products was not value-free and that the produc-
ers of such knowledge also adopted social positions, but specification 
of the social embedding of knowledge production calls for a different 
attitude towards dealing with knowledge and science. Not everyone 
is used to doing so, which may explain why science is often subject 
to ambivalent and paradoxical expectations: Either there are still high 
expectations of science or it tends to be dismissed, particularly if the 
results do not correspond with existing and cherished beliefs. These 
comments refer not just to policy-oriented scientific research but also 
to academic research, which may similarly be regarded as much less 
absolute and value-free than assumed in the optimistic years of the 
1970s and 1980s.
V
These changes were largely of an internal nature in science. External 
factors have also contributed towards the changes in attitude re-
garding knowledge. The concept of knowledge has been broadened 
with the introduction of information technology. Almost everything, 
or at least a great deal, is currently termed ‘knowledge’, ranging from 
a simple web page to the finest knowledge centres. I was recently  
invited to the opening of a brand-new knowledge centre for a law 
firm. It turned out to be the old library but which was now equipped  
with all sorts of new online connections. The use of the word  
‘knowledge’, at least, has increased exponentially in a knowledge 
society, but in the process appreciation of knowledge itself has got 
somewhat lost. Is it still possible to distinguish knowledge from 
information? May information be termed knowledge if nothing is  
done with that information? Is it possible to make a pragmatic  
demarcation between knowledge and information, between scientific 
knowledge and knowledge held by appliances and smart robots, 
between tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge. ‘Knowledge is in 
oneself,’ I often hear captains of industry say, like veritable sages from 
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the east. Everyone is a knowledge carrier, and to a certain extent that 
is true. But in that case, everyone could also contribute towards the 
ongoing extension of knowledge and to the further scientific realisa-
tion of human society. Do we then in fact need think tanks, if everyone 
is able to feed on the tree of knowledge? I hope that you will by now 
have noticed that I have myself taken part in this loose definition of the 
concept of knowledge over the past five minutes, whereas you may in 
fact have expected from a scientific practitioner a clearly defined and 
demarcated concept, to make everything clear and distinct again.
In this way, the change in the concept of knowledge and the signifi-
cance of knowledge contributes towards the delegitimation of scien-
tific knowledge, except where it is at a great distance from the daily 
world of experience of the public, such as the remote fields of string 
theory or cell biology. The respect for ‘higher’ knowledge continues, 
while knowledge has also become more ordinary.
However, apart from the extension of the concept of knowledge I 
am also aware of a narrowing of this concept, one which has become 
incorporated into the discourse concerning the knowledge society. 
Knowledge is narrowed down to economically-useful knowledge. 
That applies especially to the knowledge society or the Lisbon agree-
ments. In fact this is not particularly new; the emphasis on economi-
cally-usable knowledge goes back a long way. The difference now 
is that this usable knowledge is being detached from the traditional 
institutions of culture and science which, while they did not produce 
directly useful knowledge on call, did foster a scientifically-minded 
culture from which many new discoveries and other creative activi-
ties and undertakings could arise. The Lisbon targets are indeed at risk 
of becoming narrowed, for example into a target such as 60 per cent 
of the population aged between twenty-one and twenty-seven must 
at least obtain a higher vocational education certificate. If an iq of ap-
proximately 110 – 120 is required in order to obtain such a certificate, 
it may even be calculated that standards in this form of tertiary educa-
tion will need to come down if 60 per cent of the young generation is 
to qualify. In other words, an overly one-sided or too specific a target 
can nullify the attainment of a general improvement in the level of 
knowledge in our society. A conception of a knowledge centre as an 
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old, fairly autonomous university in which freedom and unfettered 
research remain possible may well contribute more towards the 
growth of knowledge than annual targets expressed in the number of 
certificates or other economically-determined indicators.
Finally, technology as an external driver of knowledge also plays a 
role in the changes to the knowledge landscape. One may seek to 
change or improve people’s behaviour by means of a loud and clear 
moral appeal, but it may be that technologies are able to regulate 
behaviour more efficiently. If one wishes to enforce the 100-kilome-
tre-per-hour speed limit on motorways more effectively for climate 
reasons, this can more easily be achieved by fitting smart speed 
governors in all vehicles than laboriously trying to persuade citizens 
to modify their behaviour by means of all sorts of norms and threats. 
It’s better to have a car that refuses to start if the driver has drunk too 
much than to conduct three-monthly information campaigns.
VI
Reviewing all these changes in terms of this unduly brief account of 
the changing place of knowledge and science, it does not become any 
easier to answer the question concerning the need for scientific policy 
advice, for example in the form of a Scientific Council for Govern-
ment Policy. The changing political climate is also not conducive: 
Partly in response to the media, politicians and administrators like 
to be in direct touch with the public. They take more notice of focus 
groups and the electorate than of the traditional frameworks of the 
state. In consequence, politicians also appear to be less interested 
in and have less need for solid scientific reports from an advisory 
Council seen as dating from some bygone age. The familiar associa-
tions aroused by reports are that they are too thick, unreadable, over 
people’s heads. Something can of course be done about these negative 
perceptions, but the fundamental question remains: Do present-day 
politicians and administrators still have much to gain from scientific 
advice when it comes to their own policies and decisions? This ap-
pears to me to be the core issue of my question. But I shall wait a mo-
ment before giving my answer, as it is advisable first of all to provide 
a bird’s eye view of the carryover of wrr reports into government 
policy or more widely in the scientific community and society.
1
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VII
This topic is in fact too complex for my brief introduction. The knock-
on effect of this particular kind of scientific advice, which is fairly 
unique in the world, is now itself the object of scientific investigation. 
Two Ph.D. studies are currently underway. For review purposes I am 
obliged to work on the basis of observations and personal participa-
tion.  And when it comes to assessing the contribution made by the 
wrr it has always been and remains the case: Past results do not 
provide any guarantee for the future. At the same time, without any 
exaggeration or chauvinism, the wrr is able to look back on results 
in the past. It would not be feasible to characterise all the seventy-
nine reports over those thirty-five years, together with the numer-
ous working documents, preliminary and background studies, but a 
certain pattern does emerge if one looks at the recurrent topics that 
have been the subject of advisory reports:
• Hard economic analyses of industrial policy and the business 
climate, the changing attitudes towards economic growth, the 
recurrent or more accurately ongoing problems concerning the 
labour market and innovation, and labour force participation. A 
number of significant policy changes were made in response to 
these reports, in which regard the question still remains: Did the 
policy change come afterwards or was it a matter of the growing 
symbiosis between policy and science at a number of critical points 
in the course of government policy?
• Similarly hard analyses with regard to agriculture and environ-
ment, a field in which the wrr has not just exerted influence on 
government policy but has also built up a reputation in the aca-
demic world; spatial and urban developments may also be added 
under this heading.
• Repeated reports concerning the need to review social security; 
these reports, too, often contained an uncompromising message 
not followed up in concrete policy terms until several years later; 
the recommendations of 1999 concerning ageing remain current 
and the relevant scientific arguments and insights could help over-
come the current political impasse in this area.
• Numerous reports on Europe and foreign policy, in which regard it 
should be noted that Europe and the rest of the world will always 
be unfinished business, meaning that this advisory area consisted 
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primarily of buttressing government policy and, in particular, 
clearly formulating the policy choices that were available and, in 
some cases, urgently required.
• Notable reports published every ten years or so on immigrant 
minorities, in which regard the awkward Dutch concept of   
‘allochtoon’ or non-indigenous person – originally used in 1938 for 
Brabant and Twente labour migrants who left the poor countryside 
for Rotterdam – was popularised by the wrr. The later in date 
these reports, the more controversy they arouse – which in itself 
raises all sorts of questions.
• Reports concerning the functioning of local government, as well 
as the governmental advisory structure; somewhat wider in scope, 
the functioning of the state and democracy under the rule of law; 
this too appears to be a never-ending story, although the some-
times carefully selected analyses – such as ‘Safeguarding the Public 
Interest’ – have assumed an influence and significance of their own.
• Education reports, from secondary to higher education; the wrr 
in the role of preparing the way for educational renewal, whereby 
the recommendations that were initially dismissed out of hand 
proved years later to have been a well-founded choice. I am think-
ing in particular of innovative college education.
I do not intend to single out individual reports, but what is cer-
tainly noteworthy is that the demonstrable carryover into govern-
ment policy of a large number of the reports has been characterised 
in particular by thorough scientific analysis, based on theories and 
theoretical insights developed in the disciplines in question in 
combination with a sound collection of empirical data. This in turn 
has allowed distinctive and in some cases idiosyncratic reflection 
concerning the relevance of these data for new policy opportuni-
ties and solutions to identified problems. If the reports were not 
well received or failed to give satisfaction, it was the wrr’s fault; if 
by contrast they paved the way for successful policies the govern-
ment or politicians could take the credit: Success in policy circles 
has many fathers and mothers. But that is of no account. Anyone 
unable to put up with that kind of thing should not become an 
adviser, but anyone who fails to heed serious advice should, in my 
opinion, not become a politician. If reports were too full of opin-
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ion or were outside the scope of practical government policy, they 
would not cause any stir. 
In this rather crude, broad-brush way, I am trying to find an objectifi-
able criterion in order to answer that awkward sixty-four thousand 
dollar question: If the wrr did not exist, would there still be a clear 
need for it within governmental and political circles? Before address-
ing this question, I should like to illustrate the search for a sound and 
objectifiable response by means of an example.
VIII
Over the past few years and once again very recently, a number of 
nasty violent incidents have taken place in Dutch secondary schools, 
in which pupils have wounded and even killed each other, with one 
pupil shooting a teacher dead in the dreadful year of 2003. I regard 
these incidents as at least as shocking for Dutch society as the two 
well-known political murders that changed the political climate in 
the Netherlands. Do politicians and administrators need scientific 
advice in order to determine their policy options? 
Solid, interdisciplinary scientific analysis of the rise in violence 
among young people would designate the often neglected role of the 
widespread availability of small handguns and daggers and butterfly 
knives among young people and the price and growth market of these 
weapons as a compelling factor; anthropological knowledge would 
point to the sense of honour and codes of honour associated with the 
carrying of knives, and in general attention would be drawn to the 
market differences in the incidence of violence within and between 
states and within and between regions and urban areas. In brief, a 
great deal of knowledge is already available that is not being used at 
all. The same applies to all sorts of other subjects.
Important and, in my view, highly necessary analyses of key topics of 
government policy should in my view form a combination of:
(1) A careful collection and thorough analysis of data;
(2) plus carefully selected scientific theories and theoretical insights;
(3) plus the further specification of the urgent problem and relevant 
aspects on the basis of theory and the empirical data;
1
(4) plus a reflection on the whole with a view to policy options, 
including the parameters that need to be set for any policy;
(5) plus a well-selected policy communication drive.
If scientific policy advice possesses this combination of attributes 
– and in my view the best reports of the wrr do indeed display 
that combination – the wrr would then also be set up in rough and 
turbulent political times or, more pointedly, would have to be set up. 
And with these two statements – the hypothetical ‘would be set up’ 
and the normative ‘would have to be set up’ – I have touched on what 
is in fact the most difficult assignment for scientific policy advice of 
all: The symbiosis of knowing and wishing, of fact and norm, of sci-
ence and harsh reality.
the fate of knowledge in science, politics and society
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Prof. Bruno Latour
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 how to think like a state
Bruno Latour
Your Majesty, ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues,
What even the great philosopher Plato failed to build, the Dutch have 
been able to create and to maintain: Namely a completely indepen-
dent ‘think tank’, the ‘Scientific Council for Government Policy’, 
which has been able to provide the different branches of government 
with topical advice while simultaneously remaining part of the ma-
chinery of the State and yet able to draw as much as possible from the 
powers of thought. Philosophy in action, philosophy for action. 
If it is true that the nature of what is the State and what it is to gain 
knowledge have always been connected, we should welcome the 
occasion provided by today’s anniversary of this carefully-crafted in-
stitution to revisit the very notion of what is a ‘think tank’. We often 
metaphorically say that States have ‘Heads’, but we rarely inquire as 
to what sort of cognitive equipment they should be endowed with, 
not to mention the neurophysiology of those artificial brains... This is 
why to honour this ‘thought reservoir’, I chose to examine the ques-
tion of the sort of thinking the State is supposed to possess.
There is some (I hope unwanted) irony in having invited a French-
man to participate in this celebration, since not only was France never 
able to fulfil such a Platonic dream as yours, but she is also a country 
where the cognitive functions of the State are very much in trouble. I 
won’t go as far as saying that I am speaking to you as a representative 
of a failed State… but almost – at any rate of a State which has a lot to 
learn with respect to cognitive equipment, from yours. 
Fortunately, I am myself a traitor to my own country, since I am not 
only a total Dutchophile (even though the term, I am told, does not 
exist) but also a pragmatist philosopher, namely a disciple of John 
Dewey. 
‘Pragmatism’ in this lecture should not be understood as a synonym 
of ‘worldly’ or ‘practical’ (nor as the name of a political party) but 
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rather as the attempt made by John Dewey in the 1930s to redesign 
the tasks of democracy according to a realistic definition of what it is 
to know something scientifically.1 As John Dewey said in The Public 
and Its Problem (a brilliant title for our present historical situation): 
“The State must always be rediscovered”.2 A French pragmatist is a 
contradictio in terminis and this is why I gathered the courage to ad-
dress you on this serious but also feisty occasion.
How can we come about rediscovering the State this afternoon? 
First, we should leave aside the idea that the State will wither and 
become irrelevant through the advent of various transformations 
coming from the Left or from the Right: Revolution, communism, 
market forces, internationalism, networks of cities, regions, Europe  
or the internet. Contrary to all expectations of its progressive  
obsolescence, never was the rediscovery of the State more important 
than today. We all know the reason: Never was the State so busy, so 
overburdened than now. Every day we discover to our great dismay 
more elements to take into account and to throw into the melting pot 
of public life, instead of less. 
Not only law and order, not only commerce and war, not only 
industry and class struggles, not only city life and health, but also, 
or so it seems, the entire environment; from the quality of the air to 
the redirection of rivers, from the quotas of herrings in the North 
Sea to the slow disappearance of bees and thus of pollinated flowers 
(can you imagine Holland without herrings and flowers?! Not to 
mention The Low Countries under the sea…). What the nightmares 
of the darkest totalitarianism could not even anticipate, that a day 
would come when the State would have to manipulate the climate 
itself, the unfortunate, the unprepared, the fragile democratic States 
of today now have to take in charge –in addition to all the rest. 
Because of the various ecological crises, the State is now burdened 
with the destiny of the entire Umwelt. The question of breath-
ing freely into the atmospheres of democracy has simultaneously 
become a metaphor for freedom and the dire literal reality of climate 
control – to use a simile from Peter Sloterdijk (a great philosopher 
who, in spite of having the name of a Dutch train station, is actually 
German…).3
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Fortunately for you, of all the nations on Earth which are struggling 
to rediscover how to redesign a State able to provide a breathable 
space for its citizens through ‘climate control’, the Dutch are well- 
advanced. How fortunate you are, you Low Countries who knew 
about the ecological crisis at least a good millennium before it came 
to the public consciousness of other lands; who have known all along 
that the most important branches of local governments were the ones 
in charge of dykes and polders, or pumps and mills, or floods and 
meanders; and that there was no distinction to be made between the 
government of people who could at any point riot and destroy and 
the government of seas and rivers which could at any point over flood 
and ravage the whole commonwealth. 
On all these questions of political ecology, the Dutch, for sure, are 
very much ahead of all the other States: It is in your blood to know, 
with a very mordant type of certainty, that a failed State would im-
mediately mean a flooded land and a disappearing country. The con-
trast between Good and Bad government, a contrast so magnificently 
painted in Lorenzetti’s fresco at the town hall of Sienna, is not for the 
Dutch a matter of metaphor, but is literal indeed.4 A matter-oriented 
democracy is also, truly for you, the little finger that the little boy 
of the legend put in the dyke to make sure it did not burst… Is your 
Majesty not also in some really new and very old sense the Queen of 
an artificial Umwelt, for the fragility and resistance of which you are 
simultaneously seal, symbol and warrant?
For all those reasons, one thing is certain: The State is not about to 
disappear. 
Rediscovering the State as something that is in charge of the whole 
Umwelt in its charge has one second important consequence: We 
might finally abandon the sterile and useless debates between a type 
of limited organisation, the State, and its ‘fully rational’ alterna-
tive, the Market. From a pragmatist point of view, in the twenty-
first century, the violent struggles over the questions of finding an 
alternative to the State seem as remote as the discussions about the 
role of the Sacraments in the Low Countries during the Golden Age. 
It is amazing that such a dispute could have passed for so long as a 
serious intellectual endeavour, so obvious it is for us now that there 
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is no alternative to the State – on condition that we rediscover its 
realistic cognitive equipment. 
The problem is to find what sort of knowledge the State is able to 
gather if we wish to rediscover it. To this search for the cognitive 
function of science and of the State, we give the name of ‘politi-
cal epistemology’. The idea is simple enough: Every change in our 
conception of knowledge-acquisition instruments must have huge 
effects on what we can expect from the State to envision and to fore-
see.5 And vice versa, every inquiry into the limits of collective action 
must throw some light on what we may expect from the social and 
natural sciences.6
This is why John Dewey and his friend Walter Lippmann are so 
important for us today in rediscovering the Liberal State. For them, 
liberalism never meant the sterile opposition between State organi-
sations and Market organisations (how can anyone deny that ‘The 
Market’ is nothing but a complex bundle of carefully devised and 
fragile organisations)? It is not State versus Market, but organisations 
in the plural (the State itself is not, of course, a single agent) on top of 
other organisations. True Liberalism consists in being freed from the 
Visible and from the Invisible Hands. In other words, the thinking 
State needs its right and its left hemispheres… We are, rather, faced 
with various modes of organisation at once both partially visible (that 
is, accountable) and partially invisible (that is, unaccountable). Re-
discovering the State means replacing the obsolete quarrel between 
modes of organisation with another question altogether: What does 
it mean for any agent whose action has unforeseen consequences 
on other agents to be made accountable? And here I want you to be 
reminded of all the meanings of this word ‘account’: Accounts are 
intellectual technologies that make visible to the collective eye of the 
State what it is to envision any state of affairs.
Why has this mode of organisation so often failed, as James Scott 
has brilliantly shown in his book Seeing like a State?7 For a reason 
the French, alas, know far too well: Because the ‘common good’, the 
‘public good’, was not supposed to be produced by experimental 
and carefully accountable procedures of inquiries. The ‘public’, the 
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‘common’, the ‘disinterested’ is supposed to be, by nature and once 
and for all, radically different from the ‘private’, the ‘commercial’, the 
‘selfish’, the ‘interested’. There are people who claim, because they are 
in a position of surveying those accounts, that they know what is the 
public good without any additional empirical work of inquiry about 
the consequences of their remedies. 
John Dewey’s great insight is that, on the contrary, there is nothing 
more complex, nothing more susceptible of mistakes, nothing in 
greater need of specific and constantly-refreshed inquiries than to 
detect what, at any point, is the public’s problem. I quote: “Observa-
tions of consequences are at least as subject to error and illusion as is 
perception of natural objects.”8  In this sentence, what is important 
is the word ‘consequences’. Whatever has been planned, there are 
always unwanted consequences for a reason that has nothing to do 
with the quality of the research or with the precision of the plan, but 
with the very nature of action. It is never the case that you first know 
and then act; you first act tentatively and then begin to know a bit 
more before attempting again. It is this groping in the dark that is so 
difficult to map, especially when it is done by millions of people over 
the lives of millions of others. 
What has ruined any Statist pretension to rule is not the necessity 
of the institution itself, but its specific way of devising its cognitive 
competence, its epistemology, its theory of knowledge acquisition. 
The State, to paraphrase Lippmann, is not allowed to think properly 
in a way in which it can learn anything about what it is to compose 
the common good.9 The Heads of States, to pursue the metaphor, 
have never been furnished with any realistic knowledge-acquisi-
tion apparatus. They are portrayed either as seeing it all or as totally 
dumb. Political epistemology alternates between social engineering 
followed, when it fails, by a cheap version of Machiavellianism. The 
lessons of distributed cognition have never been learned.10
The multiplication of tentative mechanisms, on the other hand, has 
always been the forte of what passes, wrongly, for the rational alter-
native to the wasteful folly of the State, namely Markets. Naturally, 
there is nothing especially rational in market devices, but what are so 
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interesting, what are so lacking in claims of defining the public good, 
are precisely the devices themselves, which Michel Callon and his col-
leagues call for that reason “calculative devices”.11 
What is so great in the calculation of bottom lines is not their 
famed rationality, but the very simple effect of rendering calcu-
lable and thus partially accountable what it is to distribute roles 
and powers and to allocate resources. It is pure folly to imagine 
a macro-rationality that would cover the whole Earth and calcu-
late the rational outcome of all the goods and services (this is an 
absurdity as criminal when it comes from the proponents of the 
Visible Hand – a totalitarian State of global proportions – as it is 
from the propagandists of the Invisible Hand – a single world mar-
ket) but it would be even more foolish to imagine that we could 
do without any device to render accountable the exploration of the 
public good. 
The Liberal State or the Pragmatist State is not the one that engages in 
the absurd attempt of ‘limiting the State’ – the State has no predicta-
ble limits known in advance, since the public is always a new problem 
– it is organisations that are able to escape from the totally implausible 
situation of being deprived of calculating devices. How implausible 
it would be to imagine that, though for calculations of goods we need 
instruments and devices, we don’t need them for the calculation of 
the common good? For the allocation of wealth, we need bottom 
lines and accounts, but not for the allocation of the commonwealth? 
The search for the res publica, the public thing, could be done at no 
cost in equipment, in inquiry, in exploration?!
But the Liberal State is not only the one freed from the idea of a  
Visible Hand without any calculation equipment; it is also the State 
freed from the equally silly idea that calculation can replace politics. 
This is the heart of the matter, the one totally hidden behind the 
smokescreens of the obsolete debate between State versus Market. 
Accounts help in representing the state of affairs at time ‘t’, not in 
deciding what to do at time ‘t+1’, nor in predicting what will happen. 
No calculative device is a substitute for political decisions. The many 
catastrophes reviewed by James Scott in his book have all been caused 
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by this confusion between the map and the territory – give me the 
map, and I will reshape the territory!
What was put inside the thinking Heads of the State has always 
alternated between two equally improbable political epistemolo-
gies: First, the one I mentioned earlier, the one so much derided by 
Lippmann, that you could know the difference between private and 
public once and for all and without inquiry; but second, the equally 
bizarre cognitive notion that once you had calculating devices, you 
could simply calculate the optimum automatically… This idea of an 
automated calculation is not only wrong when applied to politics but 
also to the very history of mathematics (but this is another question 
that would lead us back to Plato’s idea of geometry and his fatal ap-
plication of geometry11). In one case, the Head of the Thinking State 
is a know-it-all deprived of any empirical knowledge; in the other, it 
is a moron who claims to replace the intelligence of the situation by a 
‘mere calculation’. In both cases, politics disappear. 
In one case, when the people doubt its intelligence, the State says: 
“I know what is best because I represent the public good” (which is 
silly because in truth it has no representational tools of any sort); in 
the other case, when the people doubt the results of its calculation, it 
answers: “No one has calculated, the result on the bottom line is the 
best possible optimum” (which is equally silly because there is no one 
to be accountable just at the very moment when you need to accept 
the really hard political responsibilities). True liberalism, the one of 
the pragmatist, is when you are freed from the two injunctions: “The 
State says” (and no one knows) and “the Market said” (and no one is 
accountable). 
To be accountable, on the other hand, is exactly this: To be able to give 
an account, and to be made responsible for what you conclude from 
it. Without calculative devices, politics is emptied; limited to calcula-
tions, politics is gutted.
To sum up this point, I could say that the State was never allowed to 
think like a State but always to think as if it had been struck by a stroke 
and left with only half of its brain intact. For this reason, it has always 
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been in need of a regent or a tutor of some sort, provided by one  
science or another. This is why the Pragmatist State – in Dewey’s 
sense of the word – is so different from the Modernist State. The lat-
ter also believed in science, but with this crucial difference – that one 
of the sciences of the ‘Whole’ claimed to replace the progressive com-
position of the common good.11 Law, sociology, economics, cyber-
netics, system theory: Everything has been attempted to replace its 
own original thinking by another that would deprive it of the burden 
of thinking politically like a State… Pragmatism links the cognitive 
abilities of the State not to Science with a capital ‘S’, but to Research 
– and, as any scientist knows all too well, this is not the same thing at 
all. Expertise and research are polar opposites.
By contrast, pragmatism wants to have the State become a grown-up 
at last, finally furnished with a plausible version of what it is to learn, 
to think, to provide accounts, and to decide. Pragmatists show the 
way: You need equipment, that is, calculating devices (and it is great 
that market organisations have invented so many of them) without 
which there is no way to inquire about what is the public’s problem. 
But then you cannot escape from the burden of being accountable just 
at the crucial point when the public is to be composed. At this point, 
no science (construed, wrongly in my view, as an automatism of 
calculation) will help you. In other words, the ‘Whole’ has to be de-
scribed, assembled and composed, not calculated. Such is the contrast 
I think that should be made between governance (a matter of organi-
sation) and politics (a matter of composition). Those who believe that 
governance will replace politics are the enemies of the Liberal State. 
Nothing can replace politics.
This is even more important now than it was between the wars when 
pragmatism had its brief heyday: As I said earlier, the ‘Whole’ has 
now taken a meaning that neither Lippman nor Dewey could antici-
pate, that is, the Umwelt itself, the ‘climate control’ of the very thing 
that envelops our lives. It would be a catastrophe of major propor-
tions if, just at the time when the Umwelt is to be granted a political 
expression, the State was being shrunk to nought and falling into 
disrepute (let me remind you that this year the Nobel Peace Prize was 
given not only to Al Gore but also to the ipcc, the body in charge of 
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detecting the link between climate change and human activity, a true 
‘hybrid forum’ of science and diplomacy). But it would be equally 
as catastrophic if, because of the ecological crisis, another science, 
this time ecology, was to lord over the State and to claim that it again 
knew how to calculate the common (that is, the natural) good with-
out any interference from politics.13 The undisputable laws of nature 
would, this time, wish politics away; exactly as during the earlier 
period, the laws of the Market claimed to render the State obsolete. 
Ecology would destroy what economics had not totally obliterated, 
namely the task of composing the common good and rendering ac-
countable those who do it. 
To render the cognitive abilities of our State experimental (or prag-
matist) is even more important now that even the former Nature 
has been included in the purview of our public existence. To put it 
maybe too bluntly, politics is always about the blind leading blind. 
To remind you of this might be a strange and slightly egregious way 
of celebrating the anniversary of your think tank, but I don’t have the 
feeling that you believe in providing your government with the kind 
of knowledge that Plato claimed to possess, namely foresight. The 
cognitive landscape of today is much too different. Fumbling col-
lectively in the dark through the multiple canals of feeders and sen-
sors reflects more the ways in which a Pragmatist State may acquire 
knowledge today about what is the public and what are its problems. 
Which means, of course, a very lively and diverse set of social and 
natural sciences, new types of statistical instruments, a free press; but 
more importantly, the building of the core institutions of the politics 
of the future, namely the sites where the ‘Whole’ may be composed 
instead of simply calculated. What I invoked many years ago through 
a metaphor (but this was before the ipcc got a Nobel prize!), namely 
‘the Parliament of Things’, is today precisely the site where nobody is 
allowed to deprive us all of the task of defining the ‘We’ that we form 
together, which is at the heart of political existence.14
But there is another reason why it is so important not to lose the poli-
tics of the whole. This time it is not because of the ecological crisis, 
but because of the claims of the ‘globalisers’ to already know for sure 
what is the ‘Whole’ –by which they usually mean a narrow provin-
2
t he t hi nk i ng stat e?
cial idea of what the universal values should be. In every country of 
Europe, and also of course in France and Holland, a large part of the 
bad feelings regarding politics, the Markets and the State turn around 
the very simple idea that we have been ‘abandoned by the State’, this 
time construed as something able to provide us with a breathable 
and protective envelop (to use Sloterdijk again). The screams are the 
same everywhere: “We have been abandoned by the State, we are no 
longer protected.” How can we doubt that those who scream in such 
a way are right? Is it not obvious that those who talk about the great 
winds of globalisation, of opening to the world, of taking risks, of 
abandoning the safe haven of Statism and nations, are always blatant 
hypocrites safely protected from any risk by golden parachutes and a 
fat reservoir of stock options on which is written: ‘Take no risk ever’? 
Globalisers have a very provincial view of what the ‘whole world’ is: 
What they write about is not the global at all but a lot of ‘globaloney’. 
A State that fails to protect is no longer legitimate. But it does not 
mean that we know what is a State and what sort of protective en-
velop it should be able to compose. It simply means that the alterna-
tive is certainly not between the archaic nationalist attachment to the 
land and the ‘great winds’ of the global imperium. Here too ‘the State 
has to be rediscovered’.
To conclude, I’d venture to say that the name for the politics of the 
future is clearly that of cosmopolitics, not only in the banal sense of 
being cosmopolitan (that is, culturally diverse and international) but 
in the sense of being a politics of the cosmos, that is of a good disposi-
tion of people and things.15 The Dutch have always been pragmatist 
and cc (I did not say pc), that is, cosmopolitically correct, since they 
had the immense chance of beginning the building of their State, 
literally, from the ground up; first by the ‘Waterschappen’ and then 
by the water bureaux, the ‘Rijkswaterstaat’, from the land itself, by 
pumping the sea and the salt away. The Dutch will not be surprised 
by this sudden extension of the duties of the State to encompass their 
daily natural existence as well as their overcrowded and populous 
multicultural cities. When the sea can flood your house while fanatic 
mobs threaten your mps, you gain of political life a truly realistic 
picture… 
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I wish I were Dutch: Not only would I be the subject of a most gra-
cious Queen but I would also have friends in the Scientific Council 
for Government Policy… this think tank that Plato would have 
envied, and which to function even better should simply turn its 
political epistemology from Platonism to Pragmatism.
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 speech of the prime minister to 
mark the 35th anniversary of the 
scientific council for government 
policy (wrr)
Jan Peter Balkenende
Your Majesty, Professor Van de Donk, Ladies and gentlemen,
I should like to begin my contribution to this celebration of the 35th 
anniversary of the wrr by quoting the German statesman Otto von 
Bismarck:
“Die Politik ist keine Wissenschaft - wie viele der Herren Professoren 
sich einbilden - sondern eine Kunst”.
And indeed: Politics is not science. There is a clear difference between 
the two. We see that difference clearly on the two sides of the Hof-
vijver lake in the centre of The Hague.
On one side of the lake are the gently rustling trees and softly  
crunching gravel of Lange Vijverberg, where academic discourse is 
able to unfold in a relatively calm atmosphere behind stately porticos. 
On the other side is the hectic world of Parliament in the Binnenhof, 
where journalists, citizens and administrators jostle for a place on the 
hard flagstones and where society pounds on the door day and night 
with its dreams, its needs, its worries and its opinions.
The world of politics and policy is a pressure cooker in which emo-
tions can run high. The world of science is more of a slow cooker, in 
which insights are able to come to fulfilment in a gradual and control-
led way. "Where there is shouting, there is no true knowledge," said 
Leonardo da Vinci.
And yet… and yet it is not good to separate the worlds of politics and 
science from each other completely.
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Because is politics in reality not about much more than just the issues 
of the day? In fact I would go further: Is politics not precisely about 
the longer view? The careful weighing of facts and interests? The 
focus on the future?
And is science not at its strongest when it is able to exert an influence 
on society? When it is helping to mark out the course? When, whilst 
retaining its critical impartiality, it feels a shared responsibility?  
Science is free, but it is not free from responsibility.
Precisely at this point in time there is a need for an alliance between 
politics and science. The great issues that face the Netherlands today 
are characterised by the strong emotions surrounding the issues of 
the day intermingled and interacting with visions for the long term.
Take the issue of globalisation. The Netherlands is number seven 
on the Globalisation Index. That means that we are one of the most 
open, internationally-oriented countries in the world. That orien-
tation has brought us success. But there is also a downside. More 
and more people feel they have been cast adrift in this international 
environment and do everything in their power to seek an anchor-
point to hold on to. How can we increase our dynamism whilst at the 
same time giving people more certainty within that context? That is 
a fundamental question for our time, a question to which politicians 
and scientists can only formulate answers together.
Another fundamental question: How can we connect with each other 
in a country whose people are so different? Here again, everyday 
emotions understandably play a key role. Here again, a reasoned long-
term vision is indispensable.
What we need is a political system that is open to the well-considered 
thoughts and insights of the world of science. And a world of science 
which takes into account the challenges facing politics and which also 
takes into account the questions, developments and emotions in so-
ciety. We must have respect for each other’s roles and find each other 
in our commitment to the public cause.
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Take the highly innovative way in which we have created the physi-
cal infrastructure in our water-rich country. It is an achievement of 
world class. And it is an achievement brought about by the efforts of 
administrators and scientists acting together, in close collaboration 
with the world of business and others.
We benefit today from the sound choices made in the past. And it is 
now our task to contribute to a better future for our children.
I am firmly convinced that, in a time so full of emotions, fragmentary 
forces and new developments which follow on from each other at 
a dizzying pace, courage is needed for this. Courage to forge a link 
between the world of politics and the world of science. With each 
retaining its independence, critical capacity and responsibility; but 
with the will to work together in a targeted way to achieve solutions 
– solutions based on facts, arguments and a focus on the future.
Take the energy issue, and the related need to bring climate change to 
a halt. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon, 
last week referred to this issue as “the defining challenge of our age”.
The Netherlands has the capability to play a leading role in the neces-
sary transition towards sustainable energy management. But in order 
to achieve this, we will have to make a supreme effort together.
The same applies when it comes to guaranteeing the quality and 
accessibility of health care for an ageing population. Here again, we 
have a common task.
The Netherlands accounts for 2.5 per cent of global knowledge output 
– a formidable achievement for a country with only 16 million inhab-
itants! But there is still progress to be made in the way in which we as 
a society put scientific knowledge to use. And that again is something 
that demands the combined efforts of us all.
The wrr is one of the key instruments we have at our disposal to 
establish links between science and politics.
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That is laid down in the wrr Act of Establishment. There we read 
that your task is “to supply for Government Policy scientifically 
sound information on developments which may affect society in the 
long term and draw timely attention to anomalies and bottlenecks to 
be anticipated.”
Therein lie the two elements about which I have spoken - thorough 
scientific analysis focused on the longer term, but also an eye for the 
difficulties and problems which occur in social reality.
The wrr has been acquitting itself of this task for thirty-five years now. 
And it is your wish to be a learning organisation in fulfilling that task.
Professor Van de Donk, in your programme for the period 2005-
2007 you wrote that your ambition was to secure a better connection 
between the wrr and the living world of policy, and also to see your 
reports reflected more clearly in that policy.
You gave your programme the title Ripples on the Hofvijver Lake1.
And if that title expresses your ambition accurately, I must compli-
ment you. You have indeed succeeded in causing ripples on the 
Hofvijver Lake. In fact I would go further: At times, looking out over 
the lake from the window of the little tower that is my office, I can 
actually see small waves on the surface.
The wrr has built up a solid position over the last thirty-five years in 
the political and social debate, under a series of chairmen: Kremers, 
Quené, Albeda, Donner, Scheltema and now Van de Donk.
Your reports have regularly helped smooth the way for a new ap-
proach, fitting for the challenges of the day.
I am thinking, for example, of the report Industry in the Netherlands: 
Its Place and Future2 from 1980. At a time when many approached 
industry with distrust, the wrr called for a positive attitude to entre-
preneurship. And indeed, the recovery of our economy in the 1980s 
was only made possible by an improvement in the business climate.
In 1993 the wrr drew attention to the consequences of the approaching 
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population ageing for solidarity between generations, and called for 
the abolition of early retirement. Ten years later that became govern-
ment policy.
More recently – in 2004 – you published the report Proofs of Good Serv-
ice Provision3. That report contained a call for more scope to be given to 
professionals in fields such as healthcare and education. You called on 
politicians not to smother the creativity of professionals in a plethora of 
regulatory and accountability obligations. Those ideas are now clearly 
reflected in our policy programme.
The same applies when it comes to utilising the positive forces of 
people in their immediate residential setting. The report Trust in the 
Neighbourhood4 from 2005 issues that call from every page. In our 
Forceful Neighbourhoods action plan, this approach is given tangible 
form.
Your Majesty, ladies and gentlemen, the wrr has an important role 
to play in the new knowledge and advisory system envisaged by the 
government. This underlines the trust that has been built up over the 
last thirty-five years. It is also a reflection of the great responsibility 
that the wrr carries in contributing to the future of the Netherlands; 
on the basis of scientific insights and with an eye for what moves 
society at any given time.
We live in a time when we are surrounded by a cacophony of voices. 
We live in a free, open society whose citizens are emancipated and 
who are able to express their views without restriction thanks to 
modern means of communication. That is a great good. But it also 
places great demands on the government.
The government is watched critically by everyone, and a very great 
deal is expected of it. On the one hand, the government has to be re-
sponsive to people’s emotions; to listen carefully. On the other hand, 
the government has to weigh complex interests against each other 
and mark out a properly thought-out course which helps our country 
to move forwards.
Fortunately, we do not have to do that completely unaided. We are 
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able to use our values, experiences and ideals as a compass to guide 
us. And we have science to light the dark path and, in the best of 
cases, to reveal unexpected vistas to us.
“Politik ist keine Wissenschaft.” Politics is not science. That is true. 
But we are travelling companions. Our journey will be the most fruit-
ful if we allow ourselves to be inspired by the Erasmian tradition of 
substantiated factuality, seeing each other’s point of view, argumen-
tation, discussion, level-headedness and engagement.
If we are able to do this, we will rise above the issues of the day and 
continue to see the long-term view. That is our best way of serving 
the public cause and contributing to a future in which dynamism and 
certainty go hand in hand.
I offer the Scientific Council for Government Policy my heartiest 
congratulations on this anniversary. You are thirty-five years young, 
and that is something to be celebrated.
I wish all members and staff of the Council every success with their 
highly relevant work. And I look forward to continuing our shared 
journey.
Thank you for your attention.
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 on governing and thinking ahead 
as a service to democracy
Wim van de Donk
Introduction
The Thinking State… The title of the wrr lecture this year might 
indeed be regarded as a reification of the state that is equally as 
misplaced as it is impossible. A state that thinks – can there be such a 
thing? Well, no, that’s inconceivable. At least… not in that way.
On the other hand, anyone regarding the state as a representation of a 
political community will notice that, precisely in our age, a number of 
interesting developments do emerge that strongly invite us to have a 
close look at the thinking about the thinking state. 
I am referring to a democratic community, in which the state is seen 
and recognised by the members of that community as an important 
– albeit not the only – way of shaping their common destiny in a 
forward-looking way. 
The fact that practical politics and administrative affairs benefit 
from and are prepared by careful thinking strikes me as a significant 
achievement of modern society. 
That is so even in a democracy under the rule of law, in which science 
may be an important and independent institution but one that is also 
aware of the fact that its truth cannot necessarily count on majority 
support. Political democracy and science could, indeed, be regarded 
as two competing mechanisms for learning and finding truth.
Nevertheless, the political system decided democratically almost 
thirty-five years ago to the day to set up the Scientific Council for 
Government Policy (wrr). 
The Council was even given a law of its own: The ultimate symbol 
on governing and thinking ahead as a service to democracy
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of democratic legitimacy. That act in turn explicitly underlines the 
importance of independent scientific knowledge for the formation of 
government policy. 
The fact that this concerns an important long-term interest is some-
thing you probably endorse. This does not, however, provide an 
answer to the question as to by whom and how that interest can best 
be served in the future. In an age in which both the political and the 
scientific environments are undergoing radical change, that question 
is certainly in its place.
By way of introduction to the conversation to be conducted with 
the keynote speakers at this special wrr lecture and with one of the 
editors of the book1 written to mark this anniversary, I would like to 
refer to some of those changes. In addition, I shall seek to indicate the 
potential significance of those changes for the wrr’s mission and po-
sition. Inevitably this will need to be brief; a more detailed text may 
be found in the chapter I have co-authored with Anton Hemerijck in 
the aforementioned book.
Substantive	changes
Globalisation, transnationalisation, digitisation 
One of the changes that goes to the heart of the nature of the topics 
chosen by and the working methods of the wrr is the accelerating 
internationalisation of collective affairs. It has become increasingly 
difficult to confine the tasks of a democratic state to the physical 
boundaries of a single national jurisdiction. 
The reason is obvious enough. The common destiny to which I 
referred a moment ago has become increasingly evident and more 
inevitably global in nature in all sorts of areas of human endeavour. 
Whether these are the physical aspects of the global climate prob-
lem which Bruno Latour has already mentioned, or the cultural and 
financial interdependencies that have been exposed by the mortgage 
crisis that began in the United States (which we indeed might refer 
to as both a cultural and financial ‘climate’ crisis), a deepening and 
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exhilarating globalisation provides the both inevitable and dynamic 
decor against the background of which we are today celebrating the 
thirty-fifth anniversary of the Netherlands Scientific Council for 
Government Policy.
At the same time, we need to guard against chronocentrism: At 
the time the wrr was set up, globalisation was also in evidence, as 
reflected for example in the work of the Club of Rome, which saw the 
light of day at the same time as the wrr. One of the members of the 
first Council, Professor Böttcher, was a member of both clubs.
In terms of choice of topic and also method of work, the Club of 
Rome was a precursor of a development that has become increas-
ingly important over the past three decades. I am referring to the 
international context of the production, diffusion and use of scientific 
knowledge.
 
The Club of Rome was ahead of its time and consequently ran into 
surprises that also bedevilled the wrr in forecasting the future. 
This is because people react to forecasts: Social and political realities 
behave in a different way from that of the more molecular world. This 
is something that my teacher Ig Snellen taught me.  Thinking about 
the future is a matter of twofold anticipation: The anticipation of 
developments, as well as anticipation of the reactions. That does not 
make the task any easier.
Furthermore, the way in which science is practised is changing. In 
recent decades the internationalisation of scientific endeavour has 
been driven in particular by new technologies: The Wikipedia revo-
lution has only just begun. Scientific knowledge is no longer bound in 
calfskin but is developed, shared and distributed in virtual networks. 
A think tank that does not join in will find itself sealed off and hence 
excluded and disconnected.
The position of science
When the wrr was established it was one of the first governmental 
organisations to make use of computers. While that was useful, it 
was also of symbolic importance. Already at that point computers 

t he t hi nk i ng stat e?
were associated with scientific optimism and computer models were 
often based on the implicit assumption of an all-knowing central ac-
tor who was capable of pushing the social buttons.
Reflection increasingly became a matter of calculation and recalcu-
lation. In many countries –I would refer here to the international 
comparison made by Anne-Greet Keizer in the book noted before – the 
optimism that scientific knowledge could provide the answer to the 
decidedly pessimistic diagnoses presented to the world by the Club 
of Rome led to the establishment of institutes that were more or less 
comparable with the wrr. More or less, for in terms of its indepen- 
dence and multidisciplinary composition (reflecting the interdiscipli-
nary nature of the research), the wrr was in fact comparatively unique. 
In particular, the optimism was rooted in the emergence of the social 
sciences, inspired as they are to this day by the success of their col-
leagues in the natural sciences. Economics and the social sciences also 
began to build their models. 
 
The social sciences were expected to show society the way by 
instructing the political system. The task of supporting democracy 
by identifying the truth accordingly tended to take the form of a 
somewhat technocratic paternalism. The sciences sometimes acted as 
an arrogant teacher, while the political system rapidly proved to be a 
recalcitrant pupil.
That time came to an end when it became evident on further consid-
eration that a number of problematic assumptions underlay this tradi-
tional, positivist scientific view.  At the risk of cutting corners, let me 
sum it up in this way: ‘The’ truth proved unfindable, or at least was 
the subject of dispute and debate. This often gave rise to a plurality of 
schools and paradigmatic views which, in terms of rivalry and power 
games, often matched anything to be found in politics. 
Relativisation of political capacity
Later, doubts arose concerning what had previously been held as a 
self-evident belief in the capacity of national politics to turn society to 
its hand, not least thanks to and with the aid of scientific knowledge. 
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Anticyclical budgetary policy and the calculation of an accurate orbit 
around the earth: The optimism of management and control took 
shape in the most divergent fields of policy-making. It provided 
science with a formidable status and contributed towards the high 
expectations concerning the state’s capacity for thought. Knowledge 
concerning the future amounted to the forecasting of the future. 
The wrr owes its birth certificate to that modernist optimism and 
status: A certificate that was signed in terms of the realisation that the 
relationship between science and politics was certainly no zero-sum 
game.
How different all this looked just a few years later. In fact, the first 
signs of doubt concerning both the scope for and ability of an objec-
tive and neutral science were evident during the years of preparation 
and ultimate formation of the wrr. It is not without reason that there 
were all sorts of doubts within the council concerning the feasibility 
of its terms of reference to outline the future for the next twenty-five 
years.
Kees Schuyt rightly referred in his contribution to this symposium 
to the insight already gaining ground at that time of the way in which 
the scientific production and diffusion of knowledge in fact had a 
strong social embedding. The relationship between normative and 
factual orientations in the analysis of social problems, it rapidly 
turned out, was far more complex and ambiguous than had been as-
sumed by certain (especially positivist) scientists.
That rapidly overtaken assumption was, in particular, based around 
an independent and detached position on the part of one party –  
science – in relation to the other, namely policy. These stood at a safe 
distance from one another. Their relationship was clear and distinct, 
but still marked by an often implicit competition: Scientists sought 
to direct the political system along the lines of the truth they had 
brought to light, while politicians sought to instrumentalise and even 
domesticate science for their democratic purposes.
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Reactions	and	the	future	of	the	wrr
The wrr’s activities rapidly made it clear that this was not in fact a 
productive approach. The complicated relationship between norma-
tive and cognitive dimensions of social problems became evident 
right from the initial surveys of the future the Council undertook. 
It was clear that independence pursued in isolation would be at the 
expense of the governmental part of the wrr’s terms of reference. 
For the wrr, scientific knowledge was not a goal in itself but an 
essential element in arriving at a more informed and well-founded 
policy debate. 
The wrr is called upon to establish links with the world of govern-
ment policy, and rapidly came to the realisation that the worlds of 
thinking and doing both stood to benefit from active and mutual 
interaction. 
As reflected in the interviews conducted by Jan Buevink and Paul 
den Hoed with former Council members, the wrr is consequently 
very much a bridge-builder that is required to lay firm foundations on 
both sides of the river.
Dynamics and connection
The image of the bridge is a good one, but it is also rather too static 
for what I would like to say – particularly given the changing nature 
of the future – concerning the relationship between the wrr and the 
world of politics and administration. It was for this reason that you 
saw two dancers before the tea-break. They also appear frequently in 
the book. 
When you look at these dancers, you see subtle and mutually inter-
related moves, the confusion from time to time as to who is leading 
and who is being led, the mutual dependence and the beauty of the 
at once inevitable and interlinked movement. Continual connection 
and enticement: The dance is an excellent metaphor for the factual 
relationship between science and politics.
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Thinking in terms of connections and seeing the relationship be-
tween scientific research and political decision-making as an elegant 
dance is also a way of thinking that provides opportunities if we look 
towards the future. In the first place, the image of a dynamic dance 
offers more scope than does the image of a static bridge connecting 
up two solid banks for taking account of the processes of interna-
tionalisation and digitisation outlined briefly above, together with the 
changes in the sphere of science and politics. 
On top of this, the image of the dance allows critical examination of 
the way in which the knowledge infrastructure of the future should 
be organised in the interests of administration and politics. Let me 
conclude on this point.
There is, for example, a misunderstanding that the relationship 
between the dancers is one of demand and supply, along the lines of 
‘you ask, I turn’. But matters are not quite as simple as that. It is a mis-
understanding that rapidly leads to the idea that one of the partners in 
the dance must have a directing role, and that the other must simply 
follow mechanically. 
Another misunderstanding could be that the dance will only be suc-
cessful given a central choreography. Now, a dance certainly does call 
for a certain degree of coordination and harmonisation. By no means 
all the steps, however, can be precisely determined in advance, and 
the quality of the dance will also benefit if the dancers lose them-
selves in the experience and have the freedom to play with new ideas. 
There will always be a need for spontaneous  and mutual adjustment. 
Dancing in a democracy also calls for space and for the recognition of 
and space for a multiplicity of dancers, as well as a variety of choreo-
graphic traditions. Only bureaucracies don’t like variety. But  
bureaucracies don’t dance. This means a multiplicity of viewpoints 
and approaches and a variety of movements. In a democracy a multi-
plicity of (both ideological and scientific) schools of thought will be in 
evidence, while there will also need to be room for folk-dancing.
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Let me be somewhat more precise. Extensive consideration is being 
given at the present time to reforming the system of advisory bodies. 
As chairman of the wrr I can, on the one hand, be grateful that the 
wrr appears to have had a lucky escape from the dance (to stay with 
that metaphor for the moment) and that upon the occasion of its 
thirty-fifth anniversary it can in fact be sure of reaching its fortieth 
birthday as well. I understand that for many other advisory bodies 
the prospects are highly uncertain, even though these may have more 
visible and stable grassroots support than the wrr.
The question is whether the present plans for the severe pruning of 
independent advisory bodies are in fact sensible. In this regard let me 
say the following, in the spirit of a constructive contribution towards 
thinking about learning in the service of democracy. 
As I see it, the design principles – call them ‘choreography’, if you like 
– for an effective knowledge infrastructure should not stray too far 
from the principles required for an effective democracy. Democracies 
need variety and difference, not streamlining and uniformities.  
Secondly, these principles should take account of the knock-on  
effects of the developments referred to above. What should a knowl-
edge infrastructure for a democracy look like? Let me name a few 
points, to which we might pay further attention in the discussion 
that is coming up.
A future-oriented knowledge infrastructure geared towards a 
productive and inspiring connection with the world of science and 
politics should take account of:
• The insight that the application of scientific knowledge in politics 
and policy calls for an open and an on-going active connection 
between thinking and doing. Bruno Latour has already mentioned 
that in a democracy these two are mutually reinforcing and inter-
dependent. I would like to stress that the relationship between 
scientifically-based advice and politics should be viewed more in 
terms of a complex ecology than that of a sterile hierarchy. 
• The fact that these connections need to be established in an ever 
more open, competitive and international network calling for ad-
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equate mechanisms to guarantee both variety and quality of input 
and innovation and sharing. Not just authority but, in particular, 
nodality is also important. In addition, there will be far greater 
competition and we will see the development of a multiplicity of 
new nodal points in the network of thinking by which democratic 
institutions are embraced.
• The insight that we need therefore to view the future for policy 
thinking in terms of open networks rather than closed think tanks. 
In this regard it is significant that what is of interest is not that Al 
Gore, as already mentioned by Bruno Latour, has been awarded the 
Nobel Prize; but that the greatest scientific honour was conferred 
jointly on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The 
ipcc is an open network of thought par excellence. Needless to say 
that is not an unqualified compliment: Everyone is aware of the 
dangers arising from a relatively closed network that is only too 
apt to become inward-looking. Introversion can also arise from the 
dominance of one particular discipline; the importance of interdis-
ciplinarity should certainly not be underestimated.
• The insight that dynamism and a certain degree of complexity and 
difference  are inevitable and even attractive, and that precisely for 
this reason there must be a series of independent places in which 
every opportunity is provided for taking unhurried stock of the 
latest research and that provide space for sifting out hasty argu-
mentation based purely on self-interest from contributions that 
have the general interest in mind.
• The fact that the relationship between politics and science is not a 
matter of imperative instruction but of mutual learning. The Prime 
Minister rightly referred just now to the importance of an alliance in 
which each of the partners  have their own role. That means straight 
away that the conditions for an optimal advisory system cannot be 
sought unilaterally among one of the partners involved: It takes two 
to tango. Scientists who wish to develop knowledge and deploy it 
in the public arena must learn to present their knowledge in such a 
way that it can be heeded. That will not always mean a thick report, 
but calls for investments in an entirely new repertoire of scientific 
communication. Politicians and administrators may be expected to 
take scientifically-founded advice seriously, and actively to protect 
the separate place and responsibility of scientists.
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In essence, my contribution to this symposion comes down to a 
plea not to separate democracy and science from one another but 
to recognise that the one inherently assumes the other. And also to 
recognise that the reverse applies. Science, learning and democracy all 
go together, and are not in fact attainable on their own: Science is not 
possible without freedom, while a democracy taking itself seriously 
will acknowledge the importance of a permanent process of learning. 
As defined by the well-known American political scientist Karl  
Deutsch, “power is the ability to afford not to learn” based on “the 
ability to talk instead of listen”, which science can in turn foster.2 
The importance of such learning and of a system that genuinely 
makes learning possible should, in my view, also not be underesti-
mated in the new realities in which the wrr finds itself after thirty-
five years of loyal service. In an assessment of that system we need 
to guard against the false friends of politics: The technocrats and the 
accountants whose orientations undermine the essence of the task 
and challenge of democratic politics. The technocrats are dangerous 
because they envisage democracy without science; and the account-
ants because they have a dangerously limited focus on costs and 
especially on the benefits of thinking. In that connection I think it is 
appropriate and useful to conclude with a quote from Polly van Leer 
who, together with her husband, invested a substantial proportion 
of their private wealth in a scientific think tank which, like the wrr, 
sees fundamental research as a form of public service to democracy. 
Her words have particular resonance in these days of cutbacks and 
reform:
“Before we are really prepared to concentrate on our thinking, we 
must free ourselves from the mistaken idea that ‘thinking about 
our thinking’ is a superfluous luxury. We must see clearly that our 
thinking is the unseen foundation upon which our society rests, 





1 Op steenworp afstand. Op de brug tussen wetenschap en politiek,  
Paul den Hoed and Anne-Greet Keizer (eds.)
2 Deutsch, K.W. (1963) The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and 
Control, New York: The Free Press.
3  Leer, P. van (s.a.) Reflections upon Her Thoughts, Jeruzalem: Van Leer Foundation.
Pas de deux by Wendline Wijkstra and Benji Soerel
of the Royal Conservatoire of The Hague
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Introduction by prof. Anton Hemerijck
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 introduction to the workshops 
held on 23 november 2007
Anton Hemerijck
Welcome to the invitational workshop part of the celebratory conference 
on account of the wrr’s 35th anniversary. This morning professor Lisa 
Anderson will give the keynote lecture. Lisa Anderson is professor of 
international relations at the department of political science, Columbia 
University, New York. In 2003 she published an influential volume on the 
core theme of our conference entitled Pursuing Truth, Exercising Power: 
Social Science and Public Policy in the Twenty First Century. I picked up 
the book at the 2003 annual conference of the American Political Science 
Association, read it on the flight back to Amsterdam, and then gave it to 
everybody, involved in the organisation of our anniversary conference, 
to read. I truly hope that Lisa in her lecture will continue to reflect upon 
the evolutionary contingencies of the relationship between science and 
policy, as she did so perceptively in her slim 2003 volume.  
After Lisa’s lecture we will go our separate ways in special workshops 
on, respectively, the politics of policy advice, the challenges for futures’ 
strategic studies, the role of the media in the science-politics nexus, the 
expanding reach and scope of private think tanks in an age of globalisa-
tion, and, last but not least on the manner and extent the eu, with its 
small administrative center, seeks knowledge and advice and engages 
European academics on questions of eu policy and governance. We are 
very happy and honored to also welcome the distinguished Professors, 
Yehezkel Dror from Hebrew University Jerusalem, Member of the Club of 
Rome, Peter Weingart from the University of Bieleveld, Rudy Rabbinge, 
former member of our  Council, from Wageningen University, Jerome 
Vignon, founder of the Forward Studies Unit of the eu under Jacques 
Delors, and Geoff Mulgan, director of the Young foundation, founder of 
demos, who was a key policy advisor in different positions for the Blair 
government. All of these special guests will kick of the discussion in our 
different workshops, after Lisa Anderson’s keynote introduction. 
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Yesterday Professor Wim van de Donk coined the engagement of sci-
ence and politics in terms of the metaphor of a dance.  He was criticised 
by Professor Latour and Professor Schuyt  for having a too benign 
understanding of the problematic character of the interaction of science 
and policy in modern liberal democracies. The image that came to my 
mind was one of tough politicians coming from Mars and serious aca-
demics from Venus. Although most politicians today confidently argue 
that they engage in evidence based strategic policy-making, we know 
better. In reality politicians seem more often than not led by ideological 
beliefs and vested interests, alongside of course immense time pres-
sures. On the other hand, serious researchers are known to be more 
than happy to spend years on a path-breaking study or series of articles, 
without bothering to put much energy into advocating the implications 
of their findings to those responsible for making informed political de-
cisions. This increasingly so because of peer, publish or perish pressures 
in academia. As a consequence, intelligence, research evidence and 
academic insight, may fail to find their way into public policy. 
But is bringing the world of policy and politics and the world of 
academic intelligence together really like mixing oil and water? Or 
is a productive and engaged choreography still possible? I am today 
most inclined to think of such a choreography in terms of suite, a 
succession of dances, with slow and fast movements, preludes and 
sarabandes, within which politics and academia, dancing to different 
rhythms, take turns in responding to one another in large and fairly 
transparent public spaces. A key question is whether or not we should 
somehow need to constitutionalise the choreography of the suite-like 
engagement of the spheres of politics and academia at a time when 
there are clear signes that they are increasingly growing apart. 
But let me begin with a personal anecdote. One of my study friends 
from mit is David Miliband, now minister of Foreign Affairs in the 
Brown Government of the uk.  I visited him in London, when he was 
Minister of Schools in the Blair government. I had just changed jobs 
from academia to the wrr.  David wanted to know what “exactly” the 
relationship was between the wrr and the government as implied in 
the name Scientific Council for Government Policy. I said: “David it 
is very simple. We don’t have to listen to the Prime Minister, but the 
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Prime Minister has to listen to us!” He immediately replied: “That can-
not be true!” and I said, “it’s written into Law.”  Indeed our mandate 
is to  convert independent academic expertise into political capital. 
Dangerous for short-run politics, as yesterday the Cabinet Ministers 
Hirsch Ballin and Donner underlined, but also for us at the wrr. It is 
not per se an easy mandate to be obliged to advice the government on 
issues it may want to hear about, and this on sound academic grounds.  
We are continually judged in the media on these both counts: How 
usable are ideas for public policy and politics; and to what extent are 
these ideas anchored in academic mores of scientific inquiry. In these 
politically charged and academically envious times, we often receive 
flack from both sides, most recently on our report on processes of 
national identity and identification.  On the other hand, if we stay away 
from political fire, while remaining firmly tied to traditions of methods 
of academic inference, in the long run, things are even worse.
In any event, David Miliband believed that scientific expertise should be 
clearly separated from the authoritative allocation of values, which is the 
primacy of politics. Later he became Cabinet Minister of the Environ-
ment under Blair, and I saw him on television one evening in a bbc 
World service program called Hard Talk. He strongly defended the Stern 
Rapport on the cost of climate change and he knew every detail of the 
empirical findings and academic conjectures. I felt myself wondering 
whether the Stern Rapport is a political document or a scientific study? 
But does it really matter, one way or the other? What I was seeing was 
the central part of the dance suite of the engagement of policy and  
science, where academic intelligence was selected for political capital. 
The world of politics, it is often argued in the academic literature, 
hardly satisfies the ideal conditions of a ‘learner friendly environ-
ment’ for which the haven of academia is best known for.  The nor-
mative nature of politics, the institutional density of public decision 
making, the complexity and ambiguity of policy issues, power asym-
metries, and dispersed accountabilities, to be sure, create serious 
problems for self-corrective policy learning.
Fundamental to the idea of learning is information feedback on 
performance and impending policy problems. From this perspective, 
I believe, liberal democracy is critically endowed by strong incen-
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tives to mobilise its learning capacities, much better than alternative 
political systems. First of all, strong electoral competition contributes 
to social learning. Although the indicators of success and failure are 
often ambiguous and variable, elections are important mechanisms 
that enforce public responsiveness. Moreover, since most judgments 
of politicians by voters are retrospective – evaluation of how things 
have gone while they are in office – elected leaders have a strong 
motive to solve problems before they grow to crisis conditions. And 
proponents of rival policies are always self-interestedly motivated 
to find fault with existing policies and proposals. And the media, 
especially investigative reporting, reinforce the need and incentives 
for political learning.
Fundamental to democracy is the idea to hold the state responsi-
ble for policy consequences. However unrealistic and implausible 
the conception of the state as a unitary actor with clear purposes, 
definite powers to direct policy is, in modern political systems it is 
often judged by citizens as if it were a single collective actor. This has 
concrete political consequences, stimulating public officials of the 
modern state, whether appointed or elected, to pay attention to the 
worries of important constituencies. 
 
Because re-election is always an uncertain business, politicians also 
have an incentive to pay attention, not only to media coverage and 
the last opinion poll, but also to expert ‘policy analysis’ and reports 
from strategic ‘think tanks’. The French government has its Centre 
d’Analyse Stratégique and its Swedish counterpart has its Institute for 
Futures Studies. While the German government receives official fore-
casts on the economy from five competing wizards, the Netherlands 
has, alongside the wrr, separate forecasting institutions for economic, 
social and cultural, and demographic affairs. Policy analysis takes pride 
of place in the routine operations of international organisations like the 
oecd or the World Bank. The liberalization of the international market 
of policy ideas, particularly in the 1990s, I believe is largely attributable 
to the intensification of economic internationalisation and the related 
expansion of global communication. In the wake of the alleged decline 
of the national state, this has led to a real growth industry of private 
think tanks, also in the wake more or of the alleged decline of the state. 
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The growing importance of the European Union can no longer be 
ignored as ideational resources inspiring not only European but also 
national policy redirection. As a relatively small organisation, the eu 
habitually works with ad hoc expert committees and so-called High-
Level Groups in order to analyze particular policy problems and  
recommend solutions. Typical innovations in European policy 
learning, concern problem situations in the face of which actors are 
convinced of the need to respond to pressing problems without per se 
having to agree on deep values about liberty and solidarities or broad 
political strategies like privatisation and state intervention. In the 
process of eu policy making, domestic political actors have begun to 
rethink national policies in the light of ‘common problems’ and rede-
fine public decision making in terms of ‘common concerns’, allowing 
for a broad scope of implementation repertoires. 
Participation of international networks, like the eu, oecd, ilo, and 
the un, bring about a considerable extension of learning methods and 
horizons. This is no surprise. For the more similar the problem loads 
of national states become in the face of economic internationalisa-
tion, the more policy makers believe they can learn from the experi-
ence of others. Moreover, in an external policy environment which 
has become ever more competitive, policy makers also want to learn 
from others. Effective policies, able to muster political legitimacy, I 
contend, come with a competitive advantage. 
Underlying every policy choice necessarily lies a precarious judg-
ment. Some judgments are essentially about the causes and effects 
of policy interventions. A second form of judgment is essentially 
normative. Most political understanding is based both on insight into 
values and assessments of causality. Much of the shifts in judgment 
and policy is a matter of changing causal beliefs. But some policy 
changes, whether or not in consequence of such changes in causal 
beliefs, are inherently bound up with shifts in the assessment of nor-
mative plausibility. This becomes more apparent when the practical 
defense of old policy paradigm becomes increasingly furtive and their 
normative charm threadbare. The attempt to analytically separate 
causal and normative judgment from one another, to segregate  
science from political opinion, is therefore fraught. To be sure, policy 
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experts can never displace citizens as decision makers, even when 
issues are complex and policy questions highly technical. Expertise 
facilitates judgment, independent academic intelligence can even 
bring new political capital to the public arena. In short, we are not  
living in a world of a safe distance between politics and science, 
policy and research - if we ever were?  The relationship between 
policy and research does not abide by many of the often-formulated 
clichés, like  ‘science speaking truth to power’ or, by contrast,  ‘poli-
tics on top, science on tap’. Even Max Weber was not true to his own 
principles, with scientific inquiry as a mere service to policies based 
on politically set goals and values, external to the policy process. By 
participating in the Verein für Sozialpolitik he also ventured to create 
political capital on the basis of his research, expertise and normative 
dispositions.
This is not to say that the choreography of the suite of policy and 
science is effectively and intelligently structured in liberal democra-
cies. On the contrary, it requires an appreciation of different musics, 
diverse rhythms, and improvisation talents, much like jazz musi-
cians, on the part of the leading dancers. From this perspective, I 
would like to end with a quote from Hugh Heclo, who introduced 
me to the importance of looking at the intellectual properties of the 
policy process: 
 
“Politics finds it sources not only in power but also in uncer-
tainty – men collectively wondering what to do. Finding feasible 
courses of action includes, but is more than, locating which way 
the vectors of political pressure are pushing. Governments not 
only ‘power’ (or whatever the verb form of that approach might 
be): They also puzzle. Policy-making is a form of collective  
puzzlement on society’s behalf; it entails both deciding and 
knowing” (Heclo 1974:305).1
From Hugh Heclo, without further ado, I would now like to give the 
floor to Professor Lisa Anderson. 
Thank you.  
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1 Heclo, H. (1974) Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden: From Relief to Income Main-
tenance, New haven: Yale University Press.
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 truth, authorit y and policy in the 
twent y-first century
Lisa Anderson
I wish to thank the organisers of the wrr jubilee symposium for 
providing the opportunity to consider some of the most vexing ques-
tions we face as social scientists and policy analysts at the dawn of the 
twenty-first century. The terrain before us is murky and sometimes 
bewildering but, if we are to realise our aspirations to serve the public 
good, we must consider the challenges and opportunities it is likely 
to present. I congratulate the wrr for having organised a symposium 
that permits such reflection.
In retrospect, it is apparent that the mid-twentieth century marked 
the high-water mark of the industrial welfare state, and with it, the 
authority of ‘scientific’ knowledge. Skepticism about the capacity 
of the modern state to formulate and implement just and effective 
policy grew during the second half of the century and the state gave 
way to the market, to what were known as ‘faith-based communities’ 
and to the novel social networks provoked by the technology associ-
ated with the Web 2.0, as sources of welfare and community. The 
erosion of the authority of the state revealed its intimate connections 
with – indeed, reliance upon – knowledge grounded in science as a 
method of investigation and assessment of truth. At the same time, 
the dependence of science on elements of the modern state – particu-
larly its characteristic ways of organising and conferring authority 
– left the status of science itself uncertain.   
Today, the conventions of science as a guide for policy are increasingly 
confronting skepticism, impatience and doubt. On many issues of pub-
lic moment – from stel cell research and genetically modified foods to 
climate change and race-baced pharmaceuticals – scholarly consensus 
seems to be weak or nonexistent. Yet we ask: How are we to under-
stand evidence in the absence of such consensus? How will we make 
policy in the absence of scientific certainty?  How will we reconcile 
democratic participation and newly defined sources of expertise? These 
are the dilemmas that policymakers face in the twenty-first century, 
as the growth of available information, the expansion of global access 
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to that information, and the increase of ‘user-generated authority’ 
reshape the relationship between the governed and their governments.
It is to these issues that I wish to draw your attention today. My obser-
vations build upon a slim volume I published five years ago – which 
seems fully a generation ago in light of how much has changed since 
then – called Pursuing Truth, Exercising Power: Social Science and Pub-
lic Policy in the Twentieth Century.1  Before I go directly to the issues I 
think are again reshaping the relationship between social science and 
public policy, or more broadly, between truth, authority and policy, I 
want to remind you that I bring greetings from New Amsterdam, and I 
do so in order to evoke the long pedigree of the intimate connections of 
technology, wealth, power and knowledge. The famous Dutch voyages 
of discovery, which contributed to the establishment of my own city of 
New York, may have been animated by the search for spices, but even 
that kind of novelty proved to be an important impetus to learning. As 
the historian Harold Cook has put it:
"The new trading ventures helped to foster a kind of early in-
formation economy. Economic historians have pointed out 
that knowledge is a ‘durable possession’, like capital, and just as 
important to business... The accumulation not just of things but of 
information – accurate, exacting information – was therefore es-
sential to commerce... The masters of the trading companies even 
found new ways to imagine time and space".2 
We are once again at a moment in which we are afforded the oppor-
tunity – and, indeed, required – to find new ways to imagine time and 
space. Today we speak more and more often about politics on local and 
global scales precisely because the state which grew to dominate the 
organisation of human societies in the centuries that followed this early 
globalisation is once again confronting competitors, as people increas-
ingly attach themselves to societies as varied as tiny bands of militants 
and world-wide social networks. The state is no longer the sole or even 
the principal interface between the particular and the universal, the in-
dividual and society. Alternative locations of authority and innovation 
are springing up all around us, from the mountain redoubts of Afghani-
stan to the virtual communities of the World Wide Web. 
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For social scientists, the fading role of the state is a profound chal-
lenge to the enterprise as they know it, creating multiple sites of 
public policy and multiple definitions of the public good, and – not 
incidentally – multiple sources of anxiety about the purposes and 
power of the social scientist. The crowded marketplace of claims, of 
audiences and patrons, is further complicated by the fact that it now 
extends, like markets in so many other things, across the globe. 
To illustrate my claims and to explore the dilemmas that confront 
policy analysts and policy makers today, I will look particularly at 
issues that attend the growing attention to what is called sustainable 
development, although I believe that many other policy domains 
would exhibit similar characteristics. I do so deliberately, however, 
knowing that the challenges of sustainability are not trivial issues 
here in the Netherlands, where, according to the Netherlands Envi-
ronmental Assessment Agency, the anticipated rise of the sea level 
may lead to “serious problems…in particular in the low-lying areas of 
the country.” Indeed, we are told, “it is questionable whether conven-
tional techniques can be used to maintain the current level of safety.”  
The Agency assures us that:
"To respond adequately to these projected influences, climate 
change has, to a certain extent, already been taken into account in 
various policies in the Netherlands… Technical measures include 
raising the height of dykes, expanding the capacity of pumping 
stations and intensifying beach nourishment to maintain sand 
levels along the coast. Spatial planning measures include accom-
modating flood storage areas". 3
These are expensive measures, not to be undertaken lightly, and they 
presume high levels of confidence in the scientific bases of claims 
about global warming and climate change. That confidence may be 
merited, and I will return to this question. But first I wish to remind 
you that these kinds of measures also presume that spatial planning 
can actually be accomplished in geographically circumscribed do-
mains. This, at least, we know to be false. For the first time in human 
history, we are aware of the extent to which we are all entirely at the 
mercy of people and policies not only in our own communities and 
truth, authority and policy in the twenty-first century
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countries but around the world. Holland cannot mitigate the effects 
of climate change alone, even in Dutch territory, simply by raising the 
height of dykes or expanding the capacity of pumping stations. Nor 
can the United States, Brazil or China. So, as we did several centuries 
ago, we must again find new ways to imagine space. 
And we are beginning to do so. As Partha Dasgupta points out:
"Economists have moved steadily away from seeing location as 
a determinant of human experience. Indeed, economic progress 
is seen as a release from location’s grip on our lives. Economists 
stress that investment and growth in knowledge have reduced 
transport costs over the centuries. They observe, too, the role of 
industrialisation in ironing out the effects on societies of geo-
graphical difference, such as differences in climate, soil quality, 
distance from navigable water and, concomitantly, local ecosys-
tems. Modern theories of economic development dismiss geog-
raphy as a negligible factor in progress. The term ‘globalisation’ is 
itself a sign that location per se doesn’t matter..."4
If economists are acknowledging the extent to which we must think 
in new ways about space, however, we have barely recognized that 
we must also find new ways to imagine time. How else are we to 
know exactly what will happen in fifty or a hundred years if average 
world temperatures rise several degrees or, more importantly, what 
those who are alive then would prefer we had done now?  We have 
imposed upon ourselves an obligation to plan for sustainability and 
to pursue what the Brundtland Commission Report of 1987, Our 
Common Future, called “development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs.”5 Yet, as Dasgupta asks, “how is a generation 
to judge whether it is leaving behind an adequate productive base for 
its successor?” The future is, as he reminds us, “translucent at best.”
I want to treat the questions implied by the changing dimensions of 
space and time in the twenty-first century from three perspectives: 
How we think about uncertainty and risk, how we respond to the 
changing availability of information, and how we establish and assess 
authority to make decisions for the public good.  
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Risk	and	Uncertainty
Considerable behavioral research suggests that the further away in 
both space and time a prospective risk seems to be, the less likely we 
are to take action to address or mitigate the risk itself. As Elke Weber 
puts it, “Personal evidence of global warming and its potentially 
devastating consequences can be counted on to be an extremely 
effective teacher and motivator. Unfortunately, such lessons may 
arrive too late for corrective action.”6  And even if they arrive early, 
we are resistant to learning. From Nassim Taleb’s observation that 
highly improbable events have disproportionate impact, making risk 
and uncertainty very difficult to calculate, to Philip Tetlock’s studies 
showing that social science experts are no better at prediction than 
their ignorant peers,7 there is ample and increasing evidence that even 
disciplined, scientifically trained human minds are deeply biased. We 
believe what others believe, what confirms our prejudices, what lies 
between two more extreme choices. We prefer what is more easily 
available – we really do prefer the bird in the hand over the two in the 
tree – and we are more reluctant to surrender what we have than to 
acquire what we don’t have. We penalise action more than inaction, 
even when the results are the same.8 We are, in other words, deeply 
and irredeemably human. 
And this is before we have added politics to the mix. Before we have 
taken at all seriously the impact of group dynamics, political competi-
tion, collective identities and interests, institutional structures, the 
rules of the game and much more that shapes, perhaps distorts, public 
discourse and debate.
Yet public policy – that is, decisions made by governments on behalf 
of (and, let it be remembered, at the expense of) their constituents 
– require transcending the increasingly evident human frailties as-
sociated with risk and uncertainty. We cannot discount the risk of 
improbable but catastrophic developments, yet even the best data and 
most sophisticated models have yet to provide correctives for our hu-
man frailties. The future is translucent in part because we systemati-
cally cloud the lens through which we peer at it. 
truth, authority and policy in the twenty-first century
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The scientific community knows this all too well, and it reacts to calls 
for clear and unequivocal prediction with characteristic diffidence. 
Glaciologist Robert Thomas has observed that “most scientists don’t 
want to, but I think we need a way to explore the extreme end of the 
range of possibilities.” In the absence of scientific consensus about 
both the facts and their social meaning, Michael Oppenheimer, the 
geoscientist who directs Princeton University’s Program in Science, 
Technology and Environmental Policy points out that experts typi-
cally “give a different view of the probability of various outcomes” of 
climate change impacts, further confusing the general public and the 
policymakers who are responsible for designing responses.9 The con-
tinuing doubt and uncertainty regarding the science of climate change 
may have been, as Corbett and Durfee suggest, “a deliberate, well-
financed tactic by oil and coal companies and conservative politicians 
in an attempt to undermine public confidence in science and thereby 
defer action against global warming” but it is also a reflection of the 
challenge that policy making confronts in an era when frail human 
judgment collides with virtually unlimited information.10 
The	Growth	of	Information	and	the	Decline	of	Knowledge
What do I mean in saying that information is virtually unlimited? 
Presumably there are no more data – raw facts – than there ever were, 
since the absolute number of facts must be infinite. But there is a case 
to be made that there is more information, understood as data organ-
ised systematically and, more radically that there is less knowledge 
– acquired and useful information – than in the past. 
Thanks to the development of the new communications – or, tell-
ingly, new information – technologies, we have access to endless 
amounts of systematically organised data. This alone revolutionises 
the scientific enterprise, once built upon the assumption that infor-
mation is a scarce resource, to be painstakingly developed and care-
fully husbanded. As Jensen points out “when the system of scholarly 
communication was dependent on the physical movement of infor-
mation goods, we did business in an era of information scarcity(. . . ) 
Web 2.0 presumes the majority of users will have broadband, with 
unlimited, always-on access, and few barriers to participation(. . . ) Its 
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fundamental presumption is one of endless information abundance. 
That abundance changes greatly both the habits and business impera-
tives of the online environment. The lessons(. . . ) include a general 
user impatience with any impediments [and] a fracturing of markets 
into micro markets.” 11 
In this context, the uncertainty that is necessarily a part of the 
scientific enterprise takes on a different significance. Information 
is no longer scarce, but the capacity to acquire and use it effectively 
is compromised. Knowledge becomes increasingly specialised and 
the realms in which practitioners are considered – and consider 
themselves – authoritative become increasingly circumscribed.  As 
Sheldon Ungar puts it, because “rapid developments in the quantity 
and complexity of information have occurred in practically every 
field of human endeavor” the proportion of relevant knowledge that 
an individual can expect to master is rapidly declining in virtually all 
fields.12  Mastery is therefore constricted to smaller and smaller areas 
of specialisation.
Ironically, this, in turn, contributes to the growth of uncertainty. We 
once believed that what we did not know was either unknowable or 
known by someone else whom we viewed as authoritative. Now, not 
only do we know little beyond our own specialisation, we know of 
and acknowledge fewer authorities in other fields. The privileging 
of constant information flows has not only implications for the 
organisation of information and knowledge, but for its production 
and use. Traditionally organised universities, privileging the classical 
disciplines, have difficulty fostering research that addresses issues 
that cross or transcend the largely arbitrary boundaries between such 
disciplines. This creates challenges to with I will return momentarily. 
For now, we need to note that new kinds of organisations that are less 
invested in training the next generation of disciplinary scholars and 
scientists thrive in this environment: 
"The advent of the 24/7  media and the internet have helped raise 
the profile of think tanks, enabled them to reach a larger more 
diverse audience and disseminate their publications more cheaply. 
The proliferation of organisations has facilitated greater coopera-
truth, authority and policy in the twenty-first century
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tion between think tanks and other ngo’s at the local, state, and 
international levels. This networking allows for the utilisation 
of new mechanisms to effectively influence policy and to reach 
larger audiences." 13
And these ‘larger audiences’ are not merely more numerous, they are 
scattered around the world, overlapping and transcending geopoliti-
cal units. Livingston points out that our capacity to broadcast “live 
from anywhere on Earth” has a significant but unpredictable effect 
on policy, sometimes acting as an accelerant and sometimes as an 
impediment or an agenda setting agent.14  And the ‘cnn effect’ is 
being superseded by what might be called the ‘Google effect’ – not 
merely exposure to events around the world but deliberate pursuit of 
information about such events – and soon enough the ‘Friendster ef-
fect’ – active participation in the lives of people we neither expect nor 
aspire ever to meet directly.
In these circumstances, who do we trust and why? How do these 
developments shape our sense of authority – scientific or political?
From	Peers	to	Users:	Generating	Authority	
If the new information technologies mean we know more about 
less, they also reorganise how political and social communities 
confer membership and authority. With unlimited information, we 
necessarily develop sorting mechanisms to filter what we want to be 
exposed to and what we want to know. The translation of systemati-
cally organised data, or information, into the acquired and useful 
information we consider knowledge, becomes a crucial function. 
In the distant past, when information was scarce, human societies 
assigned the functions of its preservation and translation into knowl-
edge for the community to individuals with experience and what 
would be known as wisdom, typically acquired over the course of 
time. Hence our reverence for our elders. More recently, we have at-
tributed responsibility both for assessing the validity of information 
and for converting it into useful knowledge to professionals trained 
to do so – teachers and preachers – and  still more recently to social 
groups responsible for generating new information and creating new 
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knowledge: Scholars and scientists. Authority was established less 
through age than through education, both for individuals, whose 
disciplined outlook would reflect their exposure to the canons and 
methods of scholarship, and for institutions, like churches and uni-
versities, which were acknowledged sources of specialised education. 
Ultimately these authorities and the institutions that produced them 
parted ways, scholars and universities to become sites of scientific 
research and producers of new knowledge and religious authorities 
and religious establishments to serve as sources of succor and solace 
in the face of the existential dilemmas of risk and uncertainty. In both 
scientific enterprises and faith-based communities, however, author-
ity was conferred by communities of peers: The religious establish-
ment designated new priests and acknowledged new ayatollahs just 
as established scholars and scientists credentialed new professors and 
validated new research programs.
Today, when information is abundant – indeed, overabundant –  
we increasingly operate in virtual realms populated largely by the 
algorithmically generated ‘people like you’ who recommend books, 
or shoes or appliances to buy on Amazon.com or blogs to read in the 
diaries on the Dailykos.com or the National Review Online’s ‘blog 
row.’  In the last several weeks I have gotten email invitations from 
colleagues in Egypt and Pakistan inviting me to join Shelfari, a web-
site that describes itself as making “it easy to see what your friends 
are reading, what others with similar tastes have enjoyed, and even 
get and give book recommendations.”  There are groups on the site 
devoted to romance novels, seventeenth century British history, the 
publications of the American presidential candidates, to medicine, 
vampires, readers in Mumbai and books in Farsi.15  Within special 
interest communities like these, whether marketplaces like Ama-
zon, political sites like the Dailykos, or social networks like Shelfari, 
consensus arises from open, often heated, debate – one only needs 
to read the comments posted to political blogs to see the remarkably 
caustic and often crude tone in which these discussions are com-
monly conducted – about the preferred espresso machine, the favored 
political candidate, the ‘best’ books. 
truth, authority and policy in the twenty-first century
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This phenomenon is known as ‘user-generated authority,’ and it em-
powers the ordinary diarist and the ordinary reader, or customer, or 
citizen, in ways unimaginable only a few decades ago. In some ways, 
it mirrors the classical model of the scientific enterprise. As James 
Surowiecki has argued, the practice of scientific research has long 
been a communal proposition, reflecting what he calls “the wisdom 
of crowds.”  Authority is conferred by a community at once competi-
tive and collaborative. Surowiecki reminds us of what Robert Merton 
observed decades ago: “there is no such thing as a scientific truth 
believed by one person and disbelieved by the rest of the scientific 
community; an idea becomes a truth only when a vast majority of sci-
entists accept it without question.”16 
And so it may be in the new virtual communities. The wisdom of 
crowds may produce truth, or at least the authority to designate 
truth. As Jensen has observed, 
“MySpace, Friendster, Facebook, and other social networking 
sites are, so far, mostly about self-expression, and the key metrics 
include: How many friends do you have?  Who pays attention to 
you?  Who comments on your comments?  Are you selective or 
not?  Such systems have not been framed to confer authority, but 
as they devise means to deal with predators, scum, and weirdos 
wanting to be a ‘friend,’ they are likely to expand into ‘trust’ or 
‘value’ or ‘vouching for my friend’ metrics – something close to 
authority – in the coming years.” 17
And this will quickly be taken up in scientific communities, as what 
Jensen calls “Authority 3.0” will be constructed from features like 
the percentage of a document that is quoted in other documents, the 
numbers of links it has to other documents and how often it draws 
comments in blogs. Today’s Web of Science index, for example is an 
early precursor of this world, designed to provide “seamless access 
to current and retrospective multidisciplinary information from 
approximately 8,700 of the most prestigious, high impact research 
journals in the world,” with which “users can navigate forward, back-
ward, and through the literature, searching all disciplines and time 
spans to uncover all the information relevant to their research.”18 
This is, however remarkable it may be, merely the leading edge of 
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an avalanche of change. As Jensen suggests, “Many of the values of 
the scholarship are not well served yet by the Web: Contemplation, 
abstract synthesis, construction of argument. Traditional models will 
probably hold sway for 10 to 15 years, while we work out the ways in 
which scholarly engagement and significance can be measured in new 
kinds of participatory spaces. But make no mistake: The new metrics 
of authority will be on the rise.”19 
Daunting as the prospect may be, for many, a world which joins 
the reach of the new technologies across time and space with “con-
templation, abstract synthesis, construction of argument” sounds 
like a veritable scientific utopia. Yet, as Cass Sunstein has warned, 
in serving to filter information and provide members with useful 
knowledge, these virtual communities can also create “the pervasive 
risk that discussion among like-minded people will breed excessive 
confidence, extremism, contempt for others, and sometimes even 
violence.”20 We will read what our ‘friends’ read, buy what they buy, 
and support the policies they support, all without even knowing 
what the range of choice might be. In the face of the cosmopolitan 
temptations of unlimited information from all quarters of the world, 
we will grow steadily more insular and narrow-minded. 
This is, of course, antithetical to liberal democracy and that is what 
worries Sunstein. As he puts it, “the system of free expression must 
do far more than avoid censorship: It must ensure that people are 
exposed to competing perspectives. Members of a democratic public 
will not do well if they are unable to appreciate the views of their 
fellow citizens, or if they see one another as enemies or adversaries in 
some kind of war.”21 
In this context the fact that there are communities for whom expan-
sive imaginings of time and space are hardly new, and for whom these 
new technologies seem to be exceptionally well-suited – communi-
ties of faith – may not be reassuring. The decline of the industrial 
welfare state in the late twentieth century, and of the associated 
authority of government and science, not only privileged the market 
as allocator of resources, but gave new opportunities to the religious 
communities of the world as institutions devoted to the welfare of 
truth, authority and policy in the twenty-first century
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believers. When modern states around the world abdicated responsi-
bilities to provide for the well-being of their citizens, it was rarely the 
market that filled the gap, certainly for the poor and disenfranchised. 
Instead, temples, churches and mosques everywhere because sanctu-
aries in an often, and increasingly, uncertain world. 
The new technologies have served to further enhance the importance 
of religious community. The heightened sense of risk and uncertainty 
produced by limitless information creates anxiety for which reli-
gious faith is a comfort and a consolation. The apparently inexorable 
replacement of neighborhoods by networks, of physical locations by 
virtual sites, permits religious communities to transcend the limits 
of time and space to reach, to teach and to comfort believers every-
where. The authority of the traditional religious hierarchies may be 
weakening, as self-proclaimed televangelists and internet preachers 
bypass the traditional establishments to testify on television and 
issue fatwahs on line, but the importance of religious identity and 
community is only amplified by the weakening of the state and the 
growth of new communications and social-networking technolo-
gies.  Whether these communities will prove to be Sunstein’s insular 
enemies or instead are reinvigorated in their commitment to the 
universalist virtues and values of faith – justice, humility, courage, 
generosity – remains an open question.
 
Democracy,	Risk,	Authority	and	Policy
For those of us for whom witnessing the power of the Lord or issuing 
religious ruling are at best only partial responses to pressing public 
policy challenges like climate change and economic development, the 
demands of the twenty-first century are daunting. We have ample  
evidence – indeed unlimited information – about the miserable  
poverty of many, many of our fellow humans in distant and once 
invisible reaches of the world. We have ample evidence about the im-
pact of today’s carbon emissions on the health and wellbeing of many, 
many of our fellow humans in the distant and still only translucent 
future. This knowledge makes demands on us; we cannot ignore it.
Yet the same forces that impose this knowledge on us equip us poorly 
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to address it. The conventions of science as a guide for policy, notably 
the reliance on consensus within an authoritative community, are 
a weak support in the face of increasing skepticism, impatience and 
doubt. On many issues of public moment, scientific knowledge 
seems narrowly specialised, scholarly consensus weak or nonexist-
ent, and academic authority diminished. Yet we make policy, with or 
without the data, the information, the knowledge we have come to 
expect from our scientific communities.
Right now, we have substituted a sort of ideological ‘balance’ or what 
in the United States is often called ‘bipartisanship’ for the truth our 
scientific communities are reluctant to certify. Having concluded that 
there is no certain truth independent of the wisdom of the crowd, we 
have declared, as Whiteside puts it, that the claim that “regulatory 
policy [should] be lifted above politics” is “illusory” and argue in-
stead that “all risk management is political.”22  And if it is all “merely” 
politics, policy can best be produced by balancing opinions, however 
well or ill-informed. 
This not only absolves the policy maker from any obligation to assess 
the merits of the policy – to weigh instead simply of balancing com-
peting perspectives – it also serves the purposes of the media profes-
sionals who are daily assaulted by the demands of the 24/7 new cycle 
of the limitless world wide web. As Zehr points out, “On occasion, 
journalists may develop controversy where none previously existed, 
or sustain it by soliciting opposing arguments by expert scientists.”23  
This does not inform the public but it gratifies the partisans and sells 
newspapers, or perhaps more to the point, drives traffic to websites. 
Robert Reischauer, of the Urban Institute in Washington, reflected 
several years ago on the substitution of the conviction of communi-
ties of like-minded people, of “interest-based communities,” for the 
evidence of sober social scientific research. 
“Public policy in the United States in recent years has increas-
ingly been conceived, debated, and evaluated through the lenses 
of politics and ideology – policies are Democratic or Republican, 
liberal or conservative, free market or government controlled. 
Discussion surrounding even much-vaunted bipartisan initiatives 
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focuses on the politics of the compromise instead of the substance 
or impact of the policy. The fundamental question – will the 
policy work? – too often gets short shrift or is ignored altogether.”
As Reischauer points out, the knowledge produced by scholarship 
and science does not create policy or guarantee its success – it merely 
frames the choices and identifies the costs of various alternatives. In 
its absence, however, policies are, as he put it, “likely to fail because 
they may not be grounded in the economic, institutional and social 
reality of a problem(. . . ) Politically acceptable doesn’t necessarily 
mean effective, affordable, or otherwise viable.”24 
Precisely because politically acceptable does not necessarily mean 
viable, this system of policy formulation and implementation is not 
sustainable. Ultimately, policy-makers will resort again to informa-
tion and knowledge generated by people with special expertise. How 
will that happen? Increasingly scientific and social scientific research 
is communicated online, on large-scale social networking platforms, 
and institutions like the  us-based Social Science Research Council 
are exploring the potential of web-based policy research ‘auctions.’  
Clients – typically public sector policy units – would advertise for re-
search they need. Providers – typically research scholars and scientists 
at universities or research centers around the world – would either 
provide citations for existing work in the area or submit proposals for 
conducting the research.25  
Early experiments suggest that this mechanism will quickly overtake 
the ‘think tanks’ that have been providing research, for both govern-
ment agencies and non-governmental advocacy organisations, for the 
last fifty years in all but the most sensitive proprietary or classified 
research domains. As the think tanks – both those based in universi-
ties and those which are independent or attached to private sector 
enterprises, like Bell Labs or Xerox parc, or to government agencies, 
like the American rand Corporation or our hosts today – are super-
seded by virtual communities of research collaboration, hierarchies 
of authority will begin to resolve into networks of expertise. Scien-
tific uncertainty will give way to a revival of the scientific commons, 
since as many viewers as want will be able to examine the raw data 
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upon which the information is based and the knowledge developed 
to inform the policy choices. Indeed, the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change represents an early effort –what would probably 
be called a beta version – of this new mechanism. They describe their 
mandate this way: 
“The ipcc was established to provide the decision-makers and 
others interested in climate change with an objective source of 
information about climate change. The ipcc does not conduct any 
research nor does it monitor climate related data or parameters. Its 
role is to assess on a comprehensive, objective, open and trans-
parent basis the latest scientific, technical and socio-economic 
literature produced worldwide relevant to the understanding 
of the risk of human-induced climate change, its observed and 
projected impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation. ipcc 
reports should be neutral with respect to policy, although they 
need to deal objectively with policy relevant scientific, technical 
and socio-economic factors. They should be of high scientific and 
technical standards, and aim to reflect a range of views, expertise 
and wide geographical coverage.”
Interestingly, they describe ‘who we are’ as the governments of the 
member countries of the World Meteorological Organisation and the 
United Nations Environment Programme; the hundreds of scientists 
all over the world who have contributed to the work of the ipcc as 
authors, contributors and reviewers and “the people” since, “as a 
United Nations body, the ipcc work aims at the promotion of the 
United Nations human development goals.” 
And indeed, in many ways, this novel organisational structure for 
organising scientific policy research will both reflect and foster the 
transformation of the relationship between the governed and the 
government in the twentieth century. No longer will the arbitrary as-
signment of citizenship limit the access of governments to informa-
tion and knowledge or the claims of individuals to just and equitable 
policy. Indeed, Sunstein’s worrisome anticipation of a world in 
which “discussion among like-minded people will breed excessive 
confidence, extremism, contempt for others, and sometimes even 
truth, authority and policy in the twenty-first century

t he t hi nk i ng stat e?
violence”20 must be measured against a past and a present in which 
differentials in social status and economic property rather than 
knowledge bred exactly those ills. We live at a moment and in a world 
in which, once again, the very meaning of wealth is being redefined as 
knowledge – you have heard of the ‘knowledge economy,’ no doubt but 
recall the seventeenth century – and where the ability to navigate the 
limitless information to which we have access becomes an increasingly 
important element of individual well-being and collective security.  
This moment and this world demands new imaginings of time and 
space, as the scale, the constituencies and the logics of politics shift 
around us. In a similar time, in 1662, a Dutch economist, Pieter de la 
Court, wrote a treatise in which he tried to explain why Amsterdam 
was a richer city, and Holland a richer country, than had ever
been seen before in the world. As Cook reports it, he observed that
“there were few landed assets, no noble ores, not much but peat 
and cows. Listing the usual kind of resources that brought wealth 
seemed pointless. His answer therefore instead addressed a 
unique quality possessed by Netherlanders, he thought: Freedom 
– freedom of conscience and freedom to work without the con-
straints of gilds or monopoly companies: In other words, freedom 
for people to follow their own passions and interests.”26  
Today, as three and a half centuries ago, there is good reason to 
believe that people following their own passions and interests will 
produce not only the “confidence, extremism and violence of compe-
tition” but the collaboration, knowledge and empathy that produces 
well-being, and will represent the building blocks of policy that 
ensures sustainable development.
Clearly, the historical relationship between social science and public 
policy will not govern their relationship in the twenty-first century. 
The retreat of the state, the expansion of the arena of policy beyond 
the public sector, indeed, beyond the here and now, have fundamen-
tally reshaped both the supply and the demand for social science re-
search. There is still a role for government, for governments will knit 
together interest communities, and regulate the research auctions, 
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and provide the well-regulated legal environment Pieter de la Court 
thought essential to freedom. As Craig Calhoun has suggested, 
“A public, including the public for social science, is not a category 
of essentially similar people. It is a differentiated body joined, at 
least in part, by the capacity of its members to sustain a common 
discourse across their lines of difference.”27 
In the twenty-first century, power is more widely distributed and 
more openly contested than it was in the 1660s, or indeed in the 
1960s. The demands that we take account of the many people for who 
we now feel what the United Nations has called, in a different context 
but in an evocative expression, the “responsibility to protect” – the 
poor and disenfranchised outside our local communities as well as 
future generations whose live we can barely imagine – represent both 
that width and that contest. 
The changing in the purposes and parameters of social science and 
public policy will permit – indeed, require – the reconstitution of 
their relationship. Universities and research centers around the world 
will play an important role in this re-engagement, representing as 
they do, not only significant sites for innovation and education in 
technical research and evaluation but important arenas of intellectual 
contestation, for the elaboration and testing of ideas about the public 
good. But they will do so not as freestanding institutions of research 
providers for local clients but as nodes in increasingly complex and 
dense networks of information, knowledge and research. 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, in most places around 
the world, in both their choices of the problems deemed to require 
a policy response and the solutions they devise to address them, 
policymakers must think self-consciously about the links between 
their tools and techniques and their values and aspirations. In doing 
so, they will redefine a universal common good and, in transcend-
ing specific locales and private interests, they will both demand and 
reward these new commitments in ways at once profoundly different 
from their seventeenth century forbearers and yet remarkably similar 
to the world in the age of discovey. 
truth, authority and policy in the twenty-first century
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 crafting the past on the future: 
realistic visions and futuristic 
nightmares?
Introduction to workshop by Yehezkel Dror
I	Fundamental	problematic
Humanity is passing through rapid and radical change processes, 
cascading towards an uncertain and in part inconceivable future.  
However, a deeper look reveals that the change processes include 
three layers changing at different rates and in different forms, pro-
ducing significant tensions and also contradictions and resulting in 
harsh problems.
The most rapid layer includes, for instance, changes in science and 
especially technology, fashions and impacts of mass media and new 
information technologies including internet. Somewhat slower but 
still pronounced in terms of one generation are some changes, for in-
stance, in geo-strategy, demography, social mores and globalisation.
The slowest layer includes invariants, the most important of which 
are human and social features that change very slowly on time scales 
ranging from several centuries to evolutionary periods. These include 
critical innate characteristics and propensities apparently hard-wired 
into our neurological and biological structures. Also crucial are basic 
characteristics of human societies, in part also found among higher 
primates, such as mixes between conflict and cooperation, signifi-
cance of leaders and emotional roles of small groups.
The third layer is in-between, with significant change usually requiring 
a few generations. It includes main features of self-identity, of culture 
in a broad sense of that term, and of social institutions such as belief 
systems, power structures, knowledge levels, hierarchies, world views 
and so on. While the speed of change of some important components 
of this layer is accelerated, core features change more slowly though 
perceptible. This layer as a whole is in part conditioned and perhaps 
programmed by innate human propensities on one hand and in part 
influenced by the surface layer on the other, while shaping the latter.
crafting the past on the future: realistic visions and futuristic nightmares?
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Looked at from another perspective, change processes are in part Dar-
winian in nature, hardly changing within human time scales, and in 
part Lamarckian, with constant change and accumulating innovations 
which are transmitted from generation to generation.
Researchers differ in their opinion on the degree to which various 
human characteristics are more innate or more susceptible to cultural 
influences, including deliberate interventions by human agency 
such as education, and in the foreseeable future genetic engineering.1 
But for our purposes a simplified differentiation between proces-
ses which are rigid within policy-relevant time horizons, say up to 
a century at most, and those which are rapidly changing within it, is 
enough. It provides the concepts which enable formulation of the fol-
lowing proposed paradigm:
While major processes posing critical problems to humanity and 
its sub-parts are changing rapidly, capacities essential for coping 
with the critical problems are changing very slowly. This leads to a 
growing capacity deficit of human problem-coping abilities.
To illustrate the first part of the paradigm, it is enough to mention 
climate, security, migration and bio-technology uses, though many 
more examples abound, such as globalisation failures, aging popula-
tions, tensions and also clashes between civilisations, public involve-
ment and solidarity displacement by radical individualism, and much 
more.
Concerning the second part of the paradigm, clearly present political 
institutions, value systems, power structures and mass opinions 
are increasingly inadequate for coping with the escalating problems. 
Thus, to elaborate just one example: Increasingly critical issues can 
only be coped with on a global scale while the future of individual 
states, including the more powerful ones, is increasingly shaped by 
dynamic variables over which they exercise less and less control. 
However, present and emerging political and social institutions and 
processes are grossly inadequate for effective global action, while 
being very slow to change in ways meeting requirements.
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To go one step deeper, without elaborating and evaluating here the 
various propositions of evolutionary psychology on hard-wired hu-
man features which were very useful and indeed essential for human 
survival in the remote past but are increasingly dangerous under mo-
dern conditions, one example will demonstrate the point: As clearly 
demonstrated by experimental psychology and decision studies alike, 
human beings as individuals, in small groups and in social structures 
suffer from inbuilt incapacities to cope well with uncertainty. This 
is dangerous for policy making, which always faces uncertainty, and 
becomes potentially catastrophic when future-shaping grand-poli-
cies are being crafted and adopter. It follows that upgrading ‘fuzzy 
policy gambling’ capacities in ways overcoming many blind spots and 
illusionary perceptions as well as fallacious reasoning is an urgent 
requirement for grand-policy crafting, to which I will return.
To balance the estimation provided above, the many advancements 
of large parts of humanity in terms of ‘human welfare’ as defined by 
undp and in humanitarian values must be emphasized. However, if 
the paradigm proposed above is at least partly correct, much of this 
progress must be viewed as surface phenomena which are largely out 
of tune with deeper processes and are likely to be disrupted by the 
latter unless ongoing processes are reset into other trajectories into 
the future.
II		Existential	Capacity	Deficit
The analysis above can be radicalized by contrasting the core feature 
of the most radical and important ongoing transformations with the 
more rigid invariants in problem-coping factors.
The most radical deep change driver of our epoch is science and 
technology. Thanks largely to them, for the first time in human 
history human agency has the ability to radically change the future 
of humanity including for better or worse. Illustrations include fatal 
ecological impacts of aggregate  human action; doomsday effects of 
nuclear and biological devices, and making homo sapient obsolete 
thanks to bio-technological creation of a different and more powerful 
neo-human being.
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The latter possibility also illustrates a result which can be viewed 
as desirable or as a catastrophic sin, depending on one’s values and 
beliefs. Further to balance the outlook, it should be noted that the 
unprecedented future-shaping power given humanity by science 
and technology can also leap humanity onto a higher level of deve-
lopment in material terms which can perhaps serve as a platform for 
higher spiritual development. But my studies of human history lead 
me to give low probability to such visions making them less realistic 
than various futuristic nightmares – unless a breakthrough occurs in 
human problem – coping capacities.
If we could trust historic processes to result in desirable futures on 
their own, in line with various teleological views, whether religious 
or secular, such as Hegel’s philosophy of history – then there would 
be no existential problem. This would also be the case if we could 
rely on societal institutions and processes, such as free markets or 
civic societies, to bring about good or at least non-disastrous futures. 
However, this is very doubtful, the opposite being not less likely in 
the longer run.
On a deeper level, the fateful question is whether innate or very slow-
ly changing main attributes of human beings and societies have the 
potential to provide the cognitive, ethical and institutional qualities 
needed for using the increasing power of humanity to shape and even 
‘make’ its futures for the better.
This question by its very nature cannot be answered scientifically, 
being one for philosophical contemplation. But, from a human action 
perspective, this does not matter: Given that we cannot be sure that 
we are doomed, it is our task, morally and practically, to do out very 
best to overcome tyrannies of the status quo which prevent us from 
coping well with the unprecedented challenges facing humanity and 
its various sub-structures.
However, as a mental background for taking up some relevant pro-
posals, and to sum up my discourse till here, let me suggest a radicali-
sed version of the paradigm above leading to an action imperative. 
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Radicalised paradigm: 
It may well be that there is an inherent ‘self-destruct’ flaw in hu-
man history, leading to rapid increases of human power to shape 
its futures while leaving human cognitive, moral and institutio-
nal capacities on how to use that power stable. To put it into a 
neo-Malthusian form: While human power to shape its futures 
increases geometrically, human capacities to use that power for 
the better improve algebraically at best. This differential produces 
an increasing incapacity to prevent wrong uses of human power 
to shape its futures, resulting at best in catastrophes followed by 
human learning, and at worst the by end of humanity.
Action imperative: 
Morally and utilitarian alike it is imperative for humanity, its in-
stitutions and leaders, to make a maximum effort to overcome this 
existential capacity deficit and to develop the qualities essential 
for using human powers to shape the future for the better, with the 
meanings of ‘better’ themselves requiring revision.
III	Grand-Policies	for	Shaping	the	Future
Incremental policy improvements are by definition inadequate for 
coping with the mega-problems posed by ongoing historic processes 
combining cascading transformations with rigidities  – which in part 
are essential for maintaining collective and individual self-identity 
and psychological stability but prevent necessary learning and inno-
vation. Instead, in respect to major issues such as ecology, migration, 
security and prevention misuses of dangerous technologies, needed 
are ‘grand-policies’.2
Crafting high-quality grand-policies is a very demanding ambition, 
requiring significant and in part radical redesign of main features 
of policy-making systems. However, before indicating some of 
the main redesign requirements a fundamental paradox must be 
solved, otherwise grand-policies suffer from a congenital con-
tradiction making the very idea of future-shaping grand-policies 
nonviable. The paradox is posed by the need to base policies on 
knowledge derived from the past, while facing ruptures in historic 
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continuity and aiming at influencing unknown and in large part 
unknowable futures.
The starting point for understanding and then trying to resolve, at 
least partly and pragmatically, this paradox is the fundamental epis-
temological fact that all our knowledge is either hard-wired into our 
brain in the form of some type of a-priories, or based directly or indi-
rectly on the past as processed by our minds with the help of intuitive 
or explicit methodologies.
This applies fully to ‘knowing’ the future. The future cannot be 
‘studied’ as it does not exit, but some outlook on possible or likely fu-
tures can be derived from our understanding of the past with the help 
of three main families of approaches, namely extrapolation, theories, 
and tacit expert knowledge. All refinements, such as Delphi, scena-
rios, alternative futures, sensitivity testing, cross-impact analysis and 
so on are but secondary techniques of the main three approaches and 
their fundamental epistemological problems.
To be added is ‘imagination’ –  which is an ill-understood facility of 
the mind which may include also ‘wild’ mental processes in addi-
tion to unavoidable grounding in the past and in now-time. Surely, 
imagination can help us think on the future, but not foresee it. True, 
there are examples of outstanding prediction of future developments 
by a few individuals. There is no way to judge whether this is the 
product of an unusual capacity to perceive meta-patterns of historic 
change, or of luck, or of some unknown ‘black box’ processes. But we 
cannot know in advance who are the very few of many self-proclai-
med ‘future seers’ may perhaps be right. We can be stimulated in our 
thinking by various ‘wild’ outlooks, but basing policies on them is 
completely reckless.
To sharpen my point, let me return to so-called ‘future studies’. 
This and related endeavors are an oxymoron, as what does not exist 
cannot be studied in any truesense of that term, only thought, 
estimated, guesses and speculated about. However, in-so-far as we 
map and understand future-shaping processes and their drivers on 
the basis of processing the past, outlook has an epistemological basis 
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and can serve as a main grounding for deliberate future-influencing 
endeavors, including primarily grand-policy crafting, by permitting 
exploration of the future range of impacts of various present action 
options – which, together with option creation – is at the core of all 
future-directed choice.
Albeit, when there is no causal chain which we can recognise  
between what we do now and the future, than policy making is an 
exercise in self-delusion. But, luckily, this is often not the case, not 
even in our epoch with all its cascading through part-ruptures in 
historic continuity into what is sure to be a very different future.
IV		Understanding	long-term	historic	processes
Let me pose an extreme test case: Assuming we move through what 
to our mind are chaotic future-shaping processes in which we cannot 
recognise any pattern and where we have no clue to identify causal 
chains between our action now and the emerging futures. In such a 
situation, living in now-time while building up elastic resources for 
coping with the unknowable, however perhaps futile, is the only 
open course. However, luckily, we are not in such a situation. We 
know or are able to know quite a lot on patterns of historic dynamics 
and on future-shaping drivers, thus having a basis, however in part 
shaky, for engaging in crafting of grand-policies which have a positive 
expected value, that is a better chance of having positive than nega-
tive outcomes.
However, one critical feature characterising the core nature of all 
grand-policies, and indeed of a vast majority of all policies and 
decisions, must be re-emphasised, without going into details which 
require separate treatment: They are in essence ‘fuzzy gambles’ for 
high stakes, without fixed probabilities and facing qualitative deep 
uncertainty.3
 
Looking on future-shaping historic processes as a whole, according to 
present understanding their patterns and meta-patterns constitute a 
dynamically changing combination between necessity, contingency, 
chance and deliberate human shaping. The importance of the latter 
is increasing. However, human choice on intervening with historic 
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processes itself is shaped by a dynamic mixture between necessity, as 
determined by relatively fixed features of the human brain and rather 
rigid social structures and cultures, by contingency and chance fac-
tors – and ‘free human choice’, including choice on reshaping action-
constraining societal institutions and human abilities themselves.
This preliminary look at long-term future-shaping historic processes 
together with the diagnosis of our epoch as characterized by radical 
changes in many of these processes, including significant ruptures in 
their continuity, together with major invariants, leads to three main 
action recommendations:
1. We must try and arrive at better and deeper understanding of fu-
ture-shaping deep processes, including recognition of the limits 
of such understanding;
2. we must try and increase the scope of ‘free choice’ of future-
shaping policies, by reducing various societal constraints which 
hinder development and implementation of innovative policies 
capable of resetting trajectories into the future so as to reduce 
the probably of the ‘bad’ and increase the ability to approximate 
the ‘good’, as the two latter are pluralistically understood and 
themselves changing in time – in part thanks to deliberate value 
architecture directed at reducing  future-endangering value 
systems;
3. we must redesign main social action processes and institutions, 
with special attention to political and governmental ones, so as to 
increase the probability of arriving at high quality grand-policies 
and implementing them.
Helping in meeting these daunting requirements are a number of 
features and possibilities, such as:
• The already mentioned importance of invariants, which on one 
hand makes crafting of grand-policies more feasible because of 
recognizable causal chains between present action and future 
realty. But, at the same time, many of these invariants limit free-
dom of choice and inhibit acceptance of necessary but counter-
conventional policies.
• The adequacy of policy time-horizons of, say, twenty to fifty up 
to a maximum of one hundred years, for achieving impacts – this 
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being a time span within which even radical shifts in historic 
processes can be recognised before reaching mature and, if neces-
sary, intervened with.
• The availability of various useful approaches for coping with 
uncertainty, including surprise events, thus making grand-policy 
crafting useful also under conditions of much turbulence. These 
include, for instance:
1) Inbuilt elasticity, making policies more robust;
2) inbuilt learning, facilitating adjustment to the unforeseen;
3) crisis management systems, permitting coping with mas-
sive unforeseen radical events, with grand-policies serving as a 
cognitive base but not a rigid commitment to a particular policy 
direction.
Still, the difficulties of the task are immense and there is little hope to 
overcoming them without radical institutional redesigns. But, before 
discussing them however briefly, let me provide some examples to 
clarify and illustrate what has been suggested.
V	Some	illustrations
Let me illustrate grand-policy option crafting possibilities and dif-
ficulties in respect to four selected policy spaces:
Mass	migration	to	the	European	Union	of	‘others’		
in	terms	of	culture
Main grand-policy options include, among others: Forceful limitation 
of such migration; facilitated and in part enforced acculturate; and 
moving societies towards multi-culturism with unavoidable dilution 
of historically produced national identities and traditions.
Less radical policies, such as trying to reduce motivation to migrate by 
improving economic and political conditions in countries of origin, 
are of very doubtful effectiveness. Various mixtures of the grand-po-
licy options are possible, but without a massive critical mass of a care-
fully considered synthesis between these and other options, migration 
will stay out of control with the probably result being very painful 
sliding towards non necessarily harmonious multi-culturism.
However, adoption of any grand-policy mix achieving a critical mass 
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so as to achieve real impact requires radical changes in widely accep-
ted values which is very hard to achieve by contemporary democra-
tic processes. Also essential is intense cooperation by all European 
Union countries despite divergent interests; and strong implementa-
tion capacities including more than a little enforcement.
Climate	change
Incremental policies, such as adopted in the Kyoto process and to be 
discussed at the Bali conference, are better than nothing, but clearly 
inadequate. However, really effective grand-policies are very costly 
now without fully guaranteed future benefits. They depend on radi-
cal value shifts on distribution of the costs between various coun-
tries. And global action without any ‘free riders’.
Present global governance is not equipped to meet these require-
ments and reliance on a ‘coalition of the willing’ has little chance of 
success before major calamities perhaps bring about effective global 
governance.
Global	security
The challenges posed to global security by the increasing power of 
fewer and fewer to slay more and more, together with proliferation of 
weapons of mass killing and prevalence of various forms of aggressive 
fundamentalism, up to the specter of doomsday devised in the hands 
of fanatics, constitute the most ominous rupture in history. Probably 
it cannot be coped with without grand-policies imposing a strict glo-
bal regime of arms limitation and inhibition of violent action, inclu-
ding control of dangerous knowledge and containment of aggressive 
believers. All these require supervisory measures contradiction much 
of presently accepted principles of international public law as well as 
some presently accepted humanitarian rules and human rights.
Controlling ‘dangerous’ knowledge, such as in bio-engineering
The most challenging choices which are likely to face humanity in 
the foreseeable future, some features of which are already with us, are 
posed by the potential provided by life sciences to ‘re-engineer’ main 
features of human beings.
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This poses moral dilemmas and practical difficulties far beyond 
present human moral and cognitive capacities, while being extremely 
controversial in terms of ethical and theological belief systems and 
various material interests alike. Even more difficult will be enforce-
ment of any grand-policy adopted in this matter, requiring as it does 
strict control of access to and use of ‘dangerous knowledge’, including 
limitations on scientific enquiry. 
I think these illustrations fully bring out the need for both radically 
improved cognitive, institutional and moral capacities and very pain-
ful constructive-destruction widely resisted by powerful actors.
VI	Relevant	lessons	from	rise	and	decline	experiences	and	
theories
One way to explore ways to make the nearly impossible possible is to 
turn to experiences and theories of rise and decline and some general 
lessons that can be drawn from them. Basing myself in part on the 
work of Dr. Salomon Wald,4  who is processing main rise and decline 
theories for policy lessons, main requirements for avoiding decline 
and facilitating rise when faced with serious challenges, as our gene-
ration is, include:
1) Radical rethinking of accepted policy orthodoxies, institutions 
and values, by top quality thinkers, professionals and rulers, with 
quality time partly protected from current issue overloads and 
‘political correctness’ taboos;
2) high quality decision making elites and of governance institu-
tions, with understanding of what is happening, rapid learning 
capacity and much policy creativity;
3) societal choice and action capacities based on a large measure of 
social cohesion;
4) willingness and capacity to cope with very painful tragic choices 
including giving up deeply held values for assuring realization of 
even higher ones. Widely accepted spiritual leaders are critical for 
doing so; 
5) power concentrations and willingness to use them, if necessary 
forcefully, for implementing novel policies involving overcoming 
vested interests, thinking inertia, political theologies and other 
tyrannies of the status quo.
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All these, together with other required governance redesigns5 and 
societal architecture, return us to the ‘Learning State’ issue central to 
this Symposium. Clearly some of the requirements are related to the 
idea of a learning state. But, while being a learning state is essential 
for long-term thriving under conditions of rapid and radical change 
with much potential for the worse, given the growing power to shape 
the future of human action this is not enough: The state must also 
be a Decisive State and a Strong State. And, taking into account the 
global nature of most of the critical issues facing humanity, thinking, 
decisive and strong states must be closely integrated into thinking, 
decisive and strong global governance. Needless to say, reality is very 
far from this.
To conclude, let me return to the grand-policy crafting components 
of a thinking state. To engage in high-quality grand-policy crafting 
quite new paradigms, approaches and methods are needed, to be 
applies by a new type of grand-policy professionals. This new type 
of policy professional is not being developed by any of the university 
programs that I know about, though some emerge on their own. They 
must be able, among many other demanding qualities, to think in 
deep history as one of the essential bases for coping with mutating fu-
tures without being caged by it, that is: Their profession is to crafting 
the past on the future while crafting the future on the past.
However, developing such professionals is child play, however dif-
ficult, in comparison with the paramount need for a new breed of top 
level politicians without which the future looks dim indeed. Therefo-
re, to finish with an unasked-for suggestion: Perhaps wrr would like 
to take up the critical but sensitive problems of improving politicians 
as one of its pioneering initiatives.
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Notes
1 For a good introduction to this controversial subject see Daniel Lord Smail, On Deep 
History and the Brain (Berkeley: University of California Press), 2008.
2  The concept in analogous to “grand-strategy”, but I prefer to limit the latter to foreign 
policy and security domains.
3 For an extensive treatment, see Yehezkel Dror, The Capacity to Govern: A Report to the 
Club of Rome (London: Frank Cass), 2002, ch. 15.
4 His study on rise and decline theories and their lessons for crafting grand-policies for the 
Jewish People will be published in 2008 by the Jewish People Policy Planning Institute, 
Jerusalem.
5 As discussed in The Capacity to Govern, op.cit.
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 how the european commission 
deals with ideas and knowledge
Introduction to workshop by Jérôme Vignon1
The aim of my presentation will be twofold:  First to reflect an insider 
view on how the European Commission deals with knowledge, as a 
sort of indispensable energy source for its engine. Secondly, I shall 
attempt to draw some lessons from my personal experience as an 
adviser to policy makers. From a Commission perspective this began 
in 1987; but it had started much earlier in the context of the now fore-
gone tradition of French policy planning. 
Knowledge	and	ideas	are	intrinsically	linked	with	the	history	
of	Europe	and	of	the	European	Union.		
From the outset, Europe has been a product of inspiration and ideas. 
In a famous work publicised after the Second World War, Denis de 
Rougemont, a forefather of European integration, demonstrated that 
the idea of ‘Europe’ has been mooted for at least twenty-eight centu-
ries.2 The mythological notion of Europe originates in its very name 
and is alleged to be that of the daughter of King Agenor, who sent his 
son abroad to search for his lost sister: He went to the west, and never 
found her. But searching for Europe is part and parcel of the making of 
Europe: Europe is a search, a never-ending quest for achieving unity 
and common purpose. 
For the ancient Greek fishermen, Europe was a westward mountai-
nous island, from which emanated a broad embracing vision. Europe 
therefore is the materialisation of a dream of universality, born from 
the monotheistic traditions, Greek philosophy and the Roman legal 
order. And later on, through the various centuries, Europe has been 
imagined and conceptualised by bold philosophers or rulers, such as 
the Bohemian King Podiebrad, or peace-orientated Protestant thin-
kers like Altusius, Grotius, Erasmus, Sully, and later by the visionary 
sons of enlightenment, Rousseau, Kant, Heine, Fourrier, Victor 
Hugo, and Salvador de Madariaga. Those lawyers, philosophers 
and mathematicians paved the way to the remarkable breakthrough 
which took place during the Second World War, where ideas of 
how the european commission deals with ideas and knowledge
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non-discrimination and equality of rights were finally translated into 
a robust, dynamic mechanism for change, called initially the ecsc, 
later on the eec, then the ec and finally the eu.3 
The enduring achievement of the Enlightenment meant that ideas 
could no longer be disassociated from knowledge and evidence: Such 
a concept has become an integral part of fully-fledged democratic in-
stitutions. In a democracy, ideas and orientations cannot be imposed; 
they have to convince and make their case through shared evidence. 
The task of constructing arguments on the basis of evidence is never-
ending; therefore dispute is also inherent to democracy; but dispute 
is also a way of strengthening and improving ideas. 
An	amazing	flourishing	of	think	tanks.
The intrinsic connection between the progress of the idea of Europe, 
the development of ideas and the underpinning of democracy with 
evidence-based policy, helps us to understand why in recent years 
– driven by the rebirth of the European integration process – an ama-
zing flourishing of European think tanks has occurred. In a recently 
publicised piece of research,4 the think tank Notre Europe, founded 
by Jacques Delors, has identified no less than 149 European think 
tanks across twenty-five Member States, where about 3,000 resear-
chers actively promote the use of expert knowledge in order to distil 
and channel ideas to policymakers and the media on what the eu 
should be or what it should do. Only 5 per cent of those think tanks 
are in Brussels. Remarkably, the famous wrr, which we celebrate 
today, has not been identified as a European think tank, and nor has 
the bepa5 as they don’t meet the criteria of being an institution... 
The same study also argues that those think tanks make a significant 
contribution to the democratisation of the eu and provides a rationale 
for their rapid development. 
	 Knowledge	is	the	energy	source	of	the	European	Commission.
I mention this connection between knowledge and the eu to set the 
scene for the topic I wish to focus on today, which is an institution 
– namely the European Commission – which can be seen as a sort of 
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government, or executive body, in order to draw the analogy between 
the wrr and its relation to the Dutch government. 
The synthesis between the Commission and knowledge is even closer 
than the connection of ideas with the concept of the eu in general. If 
the Commission is sometimes depicted as the engine of the eu, then 
to take the metaphor further, knowledge would be the engine’s fuel. 
Why is this so? I believe that it derives from the tasks and unique role 
that the European Commission occupies:
1. The Commission enjoys the monopoly of initiative within the 
institutional triangle;
2. its main task is to identify the common interest of the Member 
States;
3. its central position in Brussels can make it very remote from the 
realities on the ground; and
4. this can also contribute to remoteness from the citizens of the 
Union. 
To fulfil its mission, it is essential that the ec³receives an input of 
extensive expert knowledge and clear evidence in order to shape and 
monitor initiatives according to the common interest. The common 
interest can be defined as follows: Firstly, accurate, timely and ap-
propriate initiatives, consistent with the challenges that Europe as a 
whole faces; secondly, in order for initiatives to be valued and trusted 
they must be based on knowledge and facts which incorporate the 
wisdom and experience of the various national stakeholders. 
We can see that the purpose of the collection of knowledge and the 
way that knowledge is utilised by the Commission provides legiti-
macy in two ways: Effective and legitimate outcomes or outputs are 
achieved when the right actions are taken; and the success of these 
outcomes can only be based on legitimate inputs which are secured 
by the effective involvement of those who have access to facts and 
realities. 
how the european commission deals with ideas and knowledge
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Input,	output	legitimacy	and	processing	of	knowledge
If we look at the various tools used by the Commission to collect 
knowledge, opinions and expertise (see the inventory which was 
undertaken at the occasion of the preparation of the White Book 
on European governance),6 the components of input and output 
legitimacy are always mixed. But it is also true that the relative weight 
of both components has changed over time, and that this has had an 
impact on the mandate given by successive presidents of the Euro-
pean Commission to our very own ‘think tank’ embedded within the 
Commission. This is the experience which I would like to share with 
you now. 
When the Forward Studies Unit (fsu) was created by Jacques Delors 
at the beginning of 1989, there was no talk of a legitimacy crisis. 
However, in the midst of an apparently brilliant performance, Presi-
dent Delors was in fact pessimistic. He felt that the achievement of a 
single market, even when completed by the Euro, would not suffice 
to promote an ever closer Union – what he described as the making of 
an affectio societatis of Europe. He felt that there was a need to look 
for further motivations and grounds for deepening the European 
integration process. Exploring new avenues and approaches for that 
deepening was the precise content of the fsu’s initial mandate. 
Those years have been some of the most fascinating times of my life. 
The fsu was formed as an interdisciplinary, multinational team, with 
the aim of identifying common causes beyond the important but 
ultimately functionalist goal of achieving a single market. Some of the 
themes investigated were the demographic challenge facing Europe; 
the challenge of European sustainable development; Europe 2010 (an 
attempt to map out the situation of various industrial sectors con-
fronted with globalisation and the dual perspective of competition 
and cooperation in imperfect markets); the future of North-South 
relations; the future of employment in Europe; and also geopolitical 
uncertainties, such as the future prospects of China or Russia. The 
fsu draws simultaneously from its own resources, from the pooling 
of knowledge with other dgs,7 and of course from external studies. 
Making use of individuals drawn from different disciplines was a de-
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cisive component of the progress made, and the added dimension of 
individuals from different cultures and even religions8 was a further 
contributory factor. This work, of a rather global and forward looking 
nature, was complementary to the work of the dgs which helped 
foster alliances across the Commission as a whole and to disseminate 
the influence of the president. 
I remember well an intriguing theme, formulated by Jacques Delors 
himself, about why it came about that more and more issues were 
being required to be dealt with by the European internal market 
– resulting from a huge increase of new technologies in the areas of 
icts and bio-tech – rather than drawing on existing national jurispru-
dence. This was the beginning of a reflection on ethics and politics. In 
general, the mandates given by Jacques Delors were broad and it was 
up to us to interpret their meaning. It therefore often happened that 
we totally failed in providing the expected input in policy thinking. 
This was especially the case in the area of foreign policy. In one parti-
cular instance, close to the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, we were 
asked to think about the concept of a common European policy. The 
whole team’s efforts had been focused on this and we were somewhat 
proud of the results. However at the seminar where we presented our 
thinking, Delors expressed considerable dissatisfaction. As it turns 
out, the proposals made were quite close to the policies present in 
a recent communication9 of the Commission issued for the Lisbon 
Council. But basically the fsu had missed in that situation the first 
rule of any political advice – namely the understanding of the context 
in which the decision-maker operates.
The	turning	point	of	the	bse	crisis
Delors left the Commission in 1994, and until that moment we had 
not realised the extent to which the Commission itself, as an institu-
tion, was relying upon the input of external knowledge and expertise. 
For this to happen, we had to wait until the bse crisis, which took 
place during the Santer era, in 1996. For most of our colleagues in the 
Commission, this crisis was just a confirmation that excessive weight 
and power had been given to the Common Agricultural Policy (cap), 
how the european commission deals with ideas and knowledge
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a sort ‘d’Etat dans l’Etat’, inside the Commission. Therefore the 
immediate reaction was to split responsibilities between two dgs, 
one in charge of managing the cap, the other of protecting consumer 
health and rights.  
But for the fsu this signalled a more general condition of imbalance, 
calling into question the legitimacy of the Commission itself. We 
came to this conclusion after being alerted by Philippe Lenoble, head 
of the Department of the Philosophy of Law at Louvain la Neuve, 
to the notions of procedural governance, dealing with the ‘Haber-
massian’ concept of the ‘deliberative public sphere’. This appeared 
to have relevance for the observation of a general democratic crisis 
across the eu. Furthermore, it appeared particularly relevant for the 
eu itself. In a nutshell, Lenoble convinced us that representative 
democracy should be complemented with participatory democracy. 
When developing legislation the ‘ballistic approach’10 had become 
obsolete: Lenoble made us realise that law-making should be seen 
as a continuous and circular process, starting with the identification 
of obstacles, challenges and expectations in society and culminating 
with a close observation of implementation and monitoring elements 
of the process, which in turn feeds into questioning and moderni-
sing existing rules. At each stage of this circular process, the input of 
outsiders’ opinions, advice or expertise was decisive. Process became 
as important as objectives. 
We had started this research work in early 1995. The bse crisis was 
for us a perfect illustration of a governance failure in the way the 
Commission was dealing with knowledge.  At the time, the Commis-
sion’s aim was to keep full control of a sensitive issue, whereas we 
were entering in an era of collectively-constructed knowledge, active 
involvement of civil society and expertise that could and should be 
challenged. The Cresson crisis contributed to blur the internal vision 
of the Commission. It was wrongly interpreted as further evidence of 
the absence of accountable internal mechanisms of control and asso-
ciated with ‘malfunctions’ like those which had led to the bse crisis. 
Many felt that that this was just an example of insufficient accounta-
bility exercised by the European Parliament, or an unchecked growth 
of administrative bureaucracy. For those of us in the fsu, this did not 
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indicate an excessive development of ‘tertiary legislation’11 (the so-
called ‘comitology procedures’), but insufficient attention toward the 
quality of implementation provisions of eu legislation, rooted in the 
lack of attention given to the full process of law-making, considered 
from the view point of collecting and assembling knowledge for that 
purpose. 
An understanding that the origin of the eu legitimacy crisis was a 
complex matter only became apparent with the arrival of the newly 
elected President Prodi. At this time, ‘governance’ had become a po-
pular concept in the higher spheres of government, though not many 
understood what it was all really about.  It became apparent that that 
the fsu had accumulated some experience in this field and I was 
called back to Brussels to lead an operational team, with the aim of 
producing an European White Paper on Governance.12 Completion 
of this work took a year and the wp was issued in 2001. It was again a 
formidable experience, not least because:
• On the one hand, the outcomes remained very controversial, as 
many proponents of traditional visions of the European integrati-
on process felt challenged by the idea of participative democracy; 
they also felt that the very fact of questioning the legitimacy of 
the Commission was endangering the so-called ‘Community 
method’; 
• On the other hand, many of the ‘procedural innovations’ which 
have taken place in the last five years have been connected with 
the proposals of the wp on governance, along the three phases of 
law-making:
1. Preparatory work (standards for the quality of consultation, 
guidelines for using expertise, rules for impact assessment);
2. policy options (application of the proportionality principles, 
while considering a variety of instruments, including soft 
instruments, like co-regulation, partnership agreements, 
omc); and
3. quality of implementation, through specifying the res-
ponsibilities of regulatory agencies, clarifying the role of 
committees, reviewing the infringement procedures and 
developing joint action with national courts. 
how the european commission deals with ideas and knowledge
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Today the thrust of what is called ‘better legislation’ still derives from 
the broad investigation of the ‘Governance White Paper’. It is clear 
that further developments are still required, most notably in the field 
of impact assessments, or developing the role of regional authorities 
in the implementation of eu legislation. 
In tandem with the change in nature of the legitimacy question, the 
role of the think tank attached to the Commission’s president has 
evolved into a body that is less forward-looking and more orientated 
towards an improvement in results and delivery and pays closer at-
tention towards the expectations of Europe’s citizens. 
Some	practical	lessons	from	the	point	of	view	of	public	policy	
advice
It is now time to try to look at this experience from the point of view of 
those responsible for running a team of advisors to a public authority:
• First, it is important to rely on a clear relationship with the public 
authority in question: Any mandate given by the authority 
– whether it is given broadly or occasionally – should be as clear 
as possible, and where the public authority has expectations, 
these are clearly spelt out. 
• Second, the personal involvement of the public authority when 
assessing results is also important for the credibility of the advi-
sory body. Endorsement or rejection of results is equally impor-
tant. 
• When an important task has been entrusted by the political 
authority, then at the mid-term point of the study or report it 
might be wise to provide a menu of policy options. This helps to 
avoid significant misunderstandings and contributes towards a 
strengthening of ownership for the final outcomes.
• The overall political context in which the proposals are to be 
presented within the public domain is decisive. Journalists or 
colleagues with a communication background are all too often 
neglected within an advisory team.
• Ownership of proposals or new policy directions by the manda-
ting authority, or by its audience, should be a fundamental aim. It 
10
is far more important than the labelling of those ideas or pro-
posals by the advisory body. 
• The best results are achieved through a partnership of insider and 
outsider expertise in a policy field. Both are essential. 
• Similarly, teams of a cross-disciplinary nature are essential. Eco-
nomic science is excellent when considering resource constraints 
and limits to proposals; it obliges the team to consider many 
options. But it also tends to narrow the perspective, exaggerating 
some of the costs and neglecting some of the benefits, because of 
the tendency to restrict the analysis to measurable outputs (the 
so-called evidence-based approach).
• The contribution of all those who have participated in a study, 
or a report, should by no means be kept secret. Their acknowled-
gement is vital, also from the point of view of a requirement of a 
plurality of opinions. 
• Studies and reports should be made available to the general pu-
blic and subjected to debate.
• It is always good to assess the relevance of studies and make 
public any findings after a period of time consistent with their 
scope. 
It is now time, having reached the conclusions of this presentation, to 
return to the roots of politics. If it is true that the European political 
integration process – in contrast with previous historical experiences 
of the foundation of nation-states – draws much of its strength from a 
rational analysis that has demonstrated the benefits from economies 
of scale in a globalised world. Experience of the last decade has also 
shown that emotions, dreams and passions are still the real origins 
of politics. In that sense, European think tanks, within or outside the 
European Institutions, are supporting the European purpose only 
to the extent that they serve a true political process which supports 
ideas in an unpredictable world and captures both the emotions and 
imaginations of the people to add not just value – but also sense.
how the european commission deals with ideas and knowledge
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Notes
1 Former Head of the Forward Studies Unit at the European Commission; at present Direc-
tor for Social Protection and Social Integration in dg Employment, Social Affairs and 
Equal Opportunities.
2 Denis de Rougemont, 28 siècles d’Europe (Ed. C. Bartillat, isbn: 9782905563323).
3 European Coal and Steel Community (ecsc); European Economic Community (eec); 
European Community (ec); European Union (eu); the last two based upon the Maastricht 
Treaty.
4 Study published for ‘Notre Europe’ in 2004. L’Europe et ses think-tanks: un potentiel inac-
compli, Ed. Stephan Boucher.
5 The Bureau of Economic Policy Advisors (bepa) is the present successor of the Group 
of Policy Advisors (gopa). As think tanks attached to the President of the European 
Commission, bepa then gopa are the successors of the Forward Studies Unit launched by 
Jacques Delors in 1989.
6 c.f. ‘Rapport du Groupe de Travail consacré à l’usage de l’expertise scientifique et présidé 
par R. Gerhold’; Annexes au Livre Blanc sur la Gouvernance Européenne, com(2001), 428.
7 ‘DG’: an acronym for Directorate Generals, which form the main administrative pillars of 
the European Commission’s staff.
8 The main outcomes of the European ‘Carrefours for science and culture’, chaired by 
Jacques Delors himself, have been summarised in two books.
9 A Common European Interest, com (2007), 581.
10 A ‘ballistic approach’ to policy-making cares mainly about the target of its action. It is not 
concerned by the way of reaching the target.
11  Legally binding acts of the eu are sometimes categorised along three layers: primary legis-
lation (the Treaty); secondary legislation (Acts adopted by the Council and the Parliament 
on the basis of the Treaty); tertiary legislation (complementary rules adopted in general by 
the Commission, under the security of committees in which Member States are represen-
ted).
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 truth and trust:  
irreducible dilemmas of scientific 
advice to policymaking1
Introduction to workshop by Peter Weingart
I		Scientific	knowledge	as	a	resource	and	object	of	conflict
The slogan of the wealthy ‘association of foundations’, the Ger-
man Stifterverband, in promoting science reads: “Who does not 
know anything has to believe everything”. For the better part of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries this may not even have been re-
garded as particularly threatening. Science was, and incidentally still 
is, the most trusted institution in all Western societies, next to the 
respective Constitutional Courts. Science is supposed to produce true 
knowledge, to be a neutral arbiter in conflicts over parochial interests 
due to its universalistic values, and for that reason it is also supposed 
to operate for the common good. Of course, the Stifterverband’s slo-
gan appeals to young students who are thereby agitated not to remain 
passive victims of false promises but to take an active interest in the 
acquisition of knowledge, to develop their critical capacities. This is 
the enlightenment aspect which plays on the critical and superior 
power of scientific knowledge over all other knowledge systems in 
modern societies. 
Because of its centrality as knowledge system (thanks to its differen-
tiation from religion belief and knowledge based on critical scrutiny 
can now exist side by side) science has become involved in policy-
making on a larger scale than ever before. However, it may only play 
a role in an advisory function. Any involvement in decision-making 
proper would conflict with the principles of democratic representa-
tion, i.e. with democratic legitimacy.
The centrality of science, its augmented importance and its proximity 
to political power have a price. While trust in science as an institution 
is still high, especially highly educated and well to do societies (in 
Northern, Western and Central Europe) have differentiated reactions 
to particular scientific advances, the belief in true knowledge is no 
longer unconditional. Two kinds of reasons appear to be responsible: 
1) structural reasons, and 2) developments of the past half century. 
truth and trust: irreducible dilemmas of scientific advice to policymaking
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Structurally, the influence of certified knowledge on policymaking as 
a legitimating resource contradicts principles of democratic repre-
sentation. Thus, the more scientific experts are consulted by policy-
makers the more dramatic will be the conflict over their legitimation. 
The pertinent developments refer to the complexity of managing mo-
dern societies which is taken as a reason for the growing importance 
of scientific knowledge. Issues such as the regulation of industrial 
risks or the direction of the labor markets and pension systems etc. 
have not only confronted governments with the need to enlist ever 
more experts. They have also confronted scientists and social scien-
tists with questions they are unable to answer because of the com-
plexities and the value implications involved. One side effect is the 
revelation of uncertainties and lack of knowledge. Another side effect 
is the erosion of science’s neutrality. Not only are malfunctions of the 
system (due to coupling with economic and political interests) be-
coming apparent (most obvious in the publicised cases of fraud) but 
science is attributed self-interests (science appears as its own lobby). 
This clearly diminishes trust in science. Even though the decline of 
trust is not so much visible in the public’s responses to questionnaires 
it is manifest in the political drive for accountability and evaluation of 
science which signals that governments no longer trust the internal 
mechanisms of quality control.
The role of science in advisory contexts is not new nor is the structu-
ral conflict between knowledge and power. But this conflict is drama-
tised as the political mood has become  participatory, especially with 
respect to the shaping of technologies and the regulation of risks, i.e. 
as the coupling of science with politics and the economy has become 
tighter in general. 
This points to an apparent paradox. Scientific knowledge has gained 
enormously in social, political and economic relevance, and at the 
same time it has lost its unquestioned authority, it has become 
subject to debate and conflict and is an object of intense contention. 
Three examples in recent public debates may serve to illustrate this 
point:
1)  Climate change research: climate models which are at the basis 
of all scenarios of the future development of the global climate, 
have assumed a great agenda setting power for political and pu-
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blic debate. At the same time the models have a great uncertainty 
due to the sheer complexity of modeling climate on a global scale. 
The media play a crucial role in communicating this uncertainty 
to the public. The foremost German newsmagazine, Der Spiegel, 
moved from one week to the next from announcing publication 
of the recent ipcc report and taking it seriously to a cover head-
line: “the great climate hysteria”. Incidentally the same shift had 
already occurred once before, in the mid-1990s. And invariably, 
the media attribute self-interest – in this case that climate resear-
chers are creating a hype in order to obtain more funds and to 
push their political agenda – as a reason to be skeptical. 
Political conflict over the interpretation of climate change 
research findings is vicious as debates between the community 
of climate researchers and the us President George W. Bush 
demonstrate.
2)  Models of pandemics: Again, the models predicting the spread of 
viruses such as h5n1 (bird flu) have great dread potential. During 
the bird flu alarm in the early months of 2006 health officials in 
the who and a number of eu countries warned of a pandemic like 
the Spanish Flu in 1918 and predicted loss of life reaching into the 
hundreds of thousands in Europe. Governments were called on 
to stock medication (Tamiflu) in great quantities, and sales figures 
for the available pharmaceutics rose significantly. Added to the 
difficulty of scientific experts was the fact that they had to tread 
a thin line. On the one hand withholding or manipulating the 
facts bear the risk of being discovered later and would then create 
a serious crisis of credibility, as the bse crisis has taught. On the 
other hand publication of the exact figures, according to the norm 
of transparency, could easily be abused by the media and lead to 
panic reactions. 
 This dilemma is exacerbated by the fact that the models of pande-
mics are about as uncertain as the climate models.
II		The	organisation	of	scientific	advice	to	policymaking	as	a	
reflection	of	conflict	over	knowledge
It is commonly accepted that scientific advice has to meet the needs of 
policymakers, and that therefore it is not identical with science. The 
truth and trust: irreducible dilemmas of scientific advice to policymaking
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expertise communicated between adviser and advised is an interme-
diate type of knowledge (production). This is reflected in the duality 
of the reference of knowledge and of its quality criteria that appears 
in dichotomies like usable versus reliable knowledge – or political vs. 
epistemic robustness.
The different functions of the advisory bodies can be traced in the 
organisational structures, i.e. rules and procedures, of the advisory 
bodies. The crucial criterion according to which these bodies can be 
judged is the above mentioned duality of epistemic quality and poli-
tical acceptability of the advice that they produce. This translates into 
an organisational duality, that of the independence or dependence of 
the advisers. The crucial problem in organising scientific advice is if 
the advisers (and to what degree) should be independent or control-
led by the political side, i.e. if their political loyalty or their utility can 
be assured. Of course, the dichotomy is a simplification but it serves 
the purpose to highlight the analytical distinction between two dif-
ferent systems with different operating codes. 
The thesis is that the relevance of scientific knowledge to policy-
making and its potential impact on political decisions introduces a 
conflict into the advisory processes between scientific experts and 
policymakers over the interpretation and use of knowledge. Policyma-
kers have an interest in controlling the flow and the interpretation of 
knowledge because of its potential utility as a resource for the solution 
of their problems and, at the same time, because of its potential threat 
to their power and legitimacy. Scientific experts, on the other hand, 
are interested in having their advice taken seriously because it gains 
them reputation in their respective communities and influence in the 
political arena. The scientist – in the role of an adviser – thus, has an 
interest that is peculiar to this role. We will probably see this role of 
the professional adviser be more clearly delineated in the future. 
Thus, in contradiction to the self-perception of scientific advisers and 
policymakers alike the basic assumption is not that scientific advice 
takes place between a neutral, disinterested scientist whose advice 
may be trusted, and a policymaker who represents his constituency’s 
interests. In that traditional model of ‘truth speaks to power’ true 
knowledge appears neutral with respect to societal interests. Instead 
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it is assumed that knowledge is a resource in the political context, and 
therefore that it is an object of conflict.  
This thesis helps to better understand the different configurations 
of advisory bodies, their effects on the communication between 
scientists and policymakers, on the uses and misuses of knowledge, 
and on the conflicts and frustrations arising in the process. In contrast 
to the simplified dichotomy of autonomy versus political dependence 
of advice the reality of scientific advice is characterised by an ongoing 
process of strategic manoeuvres on both sides.  
The input of scientific knowledge into the political process takes place 
at different stages of the policy cycle and has different functions. One 
can distinguish the following functions of advice: Analysis; early 
warning; information; conceptualisation; monitoring; normative 
setting of standards. These problem oriented functions inadvertently 
have political functions as well, such as: Agenda setting; legitimation; 
moderation, and symbolic politics. Many attempts have been made to 
delineate these functions, some more convincing than others. There 
is no ultimate agreement on this exercise. For the present purpose the 
basis are the actual advisory organisations and their functions. Thus, 
first of all one can distinguish types of advisory organisations. Here 
the German system of scientific advice to policymaking is taken as 
the example. 
Type	of	advisory	body Function
Statutory ministerial advisory councils 
(Wissenschaftliche Beiräte)
Permanent critical Monitoring  
[Controlfunction]
Regulatory commissions (zkbs; ssk)
(Sachverständigenkommissionen)
Regulation, setting of standards, risk 
assessment
Statutory high-level inter-ministerial 
advisory councils 
(Sachverständigenräte)
Monitoring and analysis of policy
Ad-hoc Commissions Preparation and Legitimation of decisions
Enquête-Commissions
Information + Deliberation (in Parlia-
ment) [Agenda-Formation]
We look at the factual functions of the following set of organisational 
features, mostly procedural rules: Mandate; recruitment and selec-
tion of advisors; formal relationship to constituent; mode of opera-
truth and trust: irreducible dilemmas of scientific advice to policymaking
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tion; rules of dissemination and use of advice.
For each one can identify formal and factual functions.
Here a few examples must serve as illustrations for the functions of 
these features under the condition of conflict over expert knowledge.
Mandate: 
A broad mandate tends to favour the primary orientation of the advi-
sory body to scientific standards, thus improving the validity of the 
expertise but at the same time limiting the potential relevance of the 
advice to the policymakers (cf. statutory ministerial advisory councils 
where this is most pronounced).
A narrow mandate tends to increase the relevance of the expertise 
to the solution of the problem at hand and may also strengthen the 
authority of an advisory body because of clearly defined professional 
responsibilities (such as in risk regulating bodies). On the other hand 
it favours premature positioning of members and subsequent harde-
ning of conflicting factions (cf. ad hoc commissions).
Recruitment and selection of advisors:
Obviously the recruitment of advisers has an influence on the advice 
to be expected. Thus it is highly contested. The two solutions, self-
cooptation and recruitment by political clients, are extremes. Coopta-
tion strengthens adherence to academic standards and internal debate 
but favours conservatism of advice, distance to the addressee and 
actual problems (particularly pronounced in the Beiräte).
Recruitment by the political client may compromise scientific quality 
standards and increase the danger of politicization but may streng-
then the commitment of the advisory body to the goals and problems 
of the political client (cf. ad hoc commissions).
The representation of disciplines, on the one hand, and societal 
interests on the other are crucial features. Depending, of course, on 
the problem at hand choice of disciplines can determine the answer. 
A broader spectrum of disciplines can contribute to the political rele-
vance of the advice. The representation of stakeholders, on the other 
hand, while strengthening the acceptance of advice may compromise 
scientific standards (This pertains to risk regulation and ad hoc com-
missions in particular).
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Formal relationship to constituent
It seems obvious that advice must be given by an autonomous body  
of experts. However, the degree of autonomy is highly contested  
between scientific experts and policymakers. If the body is complete-
ly autonomous its advice may be disregarded entirely. If it is subject to 
some kind of control – usually as a narrow mandate but also informal-
ly as the attempt to direct the deliberations of the advisory body – the 
expertise may be more acceptable by the political actors but may, at 
the same time lose credibility on scientific grounds. Here one has to 
distinguish between formal and informal control. Formal control by 
mandate may delineate the problem in an inadequate but politically 
acceptable way. Informal control can intervene into the process of 
expert deliberation itself. 
Mode of operation
Most advisory committees try to reach a consensus. Obviously that 
increases their authority vis à vis the policymakers but it also signals a 
false unity of opinion where it actually does not exist. In risk regula-
tion it hides value conflicts among members. Some statues stipulate 
that a minority vote is possible. Minority votes give the client a better 
idea of the breadth of opinions among experts, of a variety of options 
to take. Thus, they strengthen the autonomy of decision-making on 
the political side.   
Rules of dissemination and use of advice
Apart from the recruitment of experts the rules of dissemination 
and use of advice are crucial in the relationship between advisory 
bodies and policymakers. If the right to publish the report of an ad-
visory body rests solely with the political client it limits the political 
risk of receiving advice that contradicts a government’s policy and 
programmatic objectives. Advice may thus be accepted selectively 
or kept secret altogether. Conversely if the right to publish rests 
with the advisory body this may protect its integrity and that of the 
advice but it may also pose a risk for the policymakers because the 
advisers may push hidden agendas and bind the politicians’ hands. 
An example for the attempt to balance these contradicting functi-
ons is the Council of Economic Experts (svr) whose annual report 
has to be published as it is handed over to the government, and the 
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government has to react to it. At the same time the report must not 
include any recommendations.
This small selection of rules and procedures of the formal advisory 
bodies illustrates how each of them may work in favour either of the 
experts’ or of the policymakers’ autonomy, and thus, either allowing 
for epistemic robustness or for political robustness of the advice. 
There is no exact fit between function and type of organisation, both 
are too fuzzy. But it is nevertheless possible to differentiate between 
several categories. Two ‘extreme’ cases can serve as an illustration. 
Regulatory commissions usually deal with scientific issues (e.g. emis-
sion standards). Their members are scientists (and possibly stake-
holders). They mostly address the operational level of ministries and 
often have a direct impact on political decisions. Yet, mostly their de-
liberations are not politicised (although there are notable exceptions, 
e.g. in the case of risk assessment of gm corn). For these bodies the 
intensity of conflicting interests is relatively low. On the other end 
of the spectrum is the Council of Economic Experts (svr). Although 
economists think of themselves as exact scientists in fact they are not. 
Their advice depends to varying degrees on ‘schools of opinion’ (e.g 
Keynesianism versus neo-liberalism). Their predictions are rarely 
precise. They address the head of government, and their advice per-
tains to a highly sensitive policy area. Thus, it is invariably politicised 
with more or less intensity, depending on whether it comes out in 
support of or opposition to current policy. 
The effects of the organisational features of advisory bodies enumera-
ted above in moderating the conflicting interests between policyma-
kers and advisers differ among these types of advisory bodies, among 
policy arenas and among disciplines involved. But in no case is the 
conflict absent, are the scientific advisers not involved in value issues 
and political judgements. As advisers or ‘experts’ they are subject to 
conflicts over knowledge.
III	Conclusion
Given the complexity and variety of advisory contexts, the diver-
gence of functions and the impossibility to balance epistemic and 
political robustness there are no ideal, let alone simple rules for 
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the organisation of scientific advice to policy making. This may be 
translated into the truth/trust framework. The power of knowledge 
(truth) over interested interpretation is constantly challenging but 
never complete. Political power is in a constant dilemma of having 
to trust scientific knowledge (and thus, scientists) at the risk of los-
ing credibility, on the one hand, and to control it at the risk of losing 
autonomy of decision-making. The dilemma cannot be solved no 
matter which schemes to moderate between truth and power may 
be invented, which concepts are coined to bridge the hiatus. Thus, 
the relation between policymakers and their advisers will always be 
a negotiated one in which rationality and acceptability will gain the 
upper hand interchangeably.   
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Notes
1 This speech is largely based on a project funded by the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy 
of Science and Humanities ‘Politikberatung in der Demokratie’ to which my colleague, 
Justus Lentsch, has contributed substantially. The concept of the analysis has also been 
shaped by the discussion among members of the ‘interdisciplinary working group’ of the 
Academy that provided the frame for carrying out the project.
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